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Twice-Told-Tales: Small Story Analysis and the Process of Identity Formation

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Let me start by laying out some assumptions – though they may be a bit oversimplified – about narrative analysis and qualitative methods. My aim is to orient the reader of this chapter toward options, that is, choices that we have when engaging in qualitative inquiry and in doing narrative analysis as a particular kind of qualitative method.

Narrative analysis, understood in a broad sense as work with texts (particularly work with written texts of narrative formats), has a long standing history. Hermeneutics, the reflective art and science of text analysis and interpretation, goes back hundreds, if not thousands, of years in the social traditions of Western and non-Western histories. It can probably even be viewed as one of the landmarks in the process of civilization (cf. Elias 1974, 1982). While a number of strands of hermeneutic analysis attempt to reveal (and analyze) underlying oral traditions of the narratives under consideration, such as of the origins of biblical stories or fairy tales (as in the collections of the oral tales by the Grimm Brothers), technological innovations over recent decades that enable the preservation of oral records have radically revolutionized the field of empirical work with narratives. For once, it has become possible to record and transcribe the language, including the concomitant performance features (such as intonation and pitch contour, pauses, gesture, eye gaze). In addition, it also has enabled innovative views of integrating these aspects of individual performances with the context of situation and concomitant actions, reactions, and interactions between the speakers and audiences within which the narratives under scrutiny are locally and communally embedded. As a consequence of this technological innovation, narratives could begin to morph slowly from their treatment as texts that re-present the meanings as encoded, preserved, and transmitted in these texts to processes within which these meanings were locally, situationally, and contextually “under construction.” In other words, what moved more into the foreground along with recent technological innovations is the functional role that narratives play in the process of interactional meaning construction: what people actually *do* when they

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tell stories – or, to put it more plainly, narratives as sites for social and individual meaning construction and not just as the carriers of what may be considered as socially and individually meaningful.

This is not meant to imply that narratives in previous traditions of inquiry have not been taken to represent sites for the analysis of social and individual meaning constructions. The long tradition of using the narrative interview as a site for tapping into the narrator's sense of self and identity, recently termed "*big story research*" (cf. Bamberg 2006, Freeman 2006, Georgakopoulou 2006b), was probably one of the most influential contributors in the turn to narrative that has worked its way into the social sciences over the last 30 to 40 years (cf. Bamberg 2007a). However, the tendency within these traditions to equate *life* and *story* and to essentialize self and identity (cf. Bamberg for a critical review, under review), that is, assuming that narrators *have* a self and an identity as some internal organizing principle locatable in the "*big stories*" they tell (and, which they, assumingly, live by), has resulted in particular forms of narrative data collection techniques and subsequent procedures of analysis. Typically, these forms of analysis do not need to account for the locality and situatedness of interactive features of narrative performance but can more directly, and as we have critically argued, often more superficially, move into the sense of self that is "*self-disclosed*" in the narrative interview situation. In contrast, the analysis of small stories, as demonstrated in recent contributions (Bamberg 2007a, b; Bamberg and Georgakopoulou, in press; Georgakopoulou 2006a; Georgakopoulou, 2007) requires a more detailed account of how storytellers appropriate particular discourses in order to position characters (in the there-and-then) and each other (the audience and themselves in the here-and-now of the telling situation) so as to display a sense of how they intend to "come across" in situated contexts as persons who "*have*" – or better "*claim*" – a sense of self. In short, small story research does not start from, and is not built on, the assumption that people *have* a sense of self as first located in the person and subsequently locatable in their stories, but that, in the process of telling stories, they engage in "identity work" that results in (local and situated) displays of a sense of self.

1 Telling and Retelling Stories for the Purpose of Identity Formation

From a big story vantage point, the question of how we acquire our stories (so that we can *have* and subsequently tell "our life") would require what Shweder, Goodnow, Hatano, Levine, Markus and Miller call tracing "the natural history of stories in children's lives" (Shweder et al. 2006, p. 749). In other words, how do people (over time) retell and revise the same stories of their lives, or at least the critical events, and in this process form a sense of self as the primary locus of a culture-specific being (cf. Baltes et al. 2006)? Thus, retellings of stories, again from the vantage point of big story research, would represent a site of practices that are aimed toward an attunement and slow integration into how individuals learn

to manage themselves as same and different from others, and as being the same in the face of constant change (navigating the uniqueness and the identity dilemma, cf. Bamberg (2007b)). Unfortunately a study of this magnitude has not been done; in addition, it may be questionable which of the stories that are told and retold actually would count as the relevant ones – so they could be argued to add up to the tellers' lives – captured and reflected in these constantly revised life stories.

However, retellings of stories have been of interest to linguists and cognitive researchers for other reasons. In particular, memory research has investigated retellings as potentially contributing to a better understanding of the interface of what actually happened, how it was “encoded” into memory; how memory “stores” these encodings (and in this storing process not only preserves but also may alter what was originally encoded), and how these memories are transformed into the act of “storying” (in the form of a second “encoding” from memory into language).

Investigations of retellings (cf. Chafe 1998; Ferrara 1994; Mishler 2004; Norrick 1998a, b) have revealed a number of factors that assist and contribute to changes and sameness (or similarities) between first and second versions. In a natural, conversationally embedded setting, and in the condition of the same audience, the way the story is told is likely to change. In its second telling, the same audience does not need to be informed about the corollary information, and the speaker can abbreviate the path to the gist – or, alternatively, can make parts that were underexplored in the first telling more relevant in the second narrative. However, we would expect the gist – the backbone of what happened – to remain pretty much the same.

In contrast, if the audience had changed and the teller could be assumed to be very much the same person, we could expect the story to be the same as well – or so it seems. Why should the teller change the sequence of events or the way the sequence was assembled and evaluated? In other words, why should a teller change a story in a second telling? It could be suggested that a difference in audience – be it different in terms of age, gender or cultural background – might have quite an effect on how tellers tailor the events and their evaluation, particularly in terms of how they intend to come across with what they tell. This change may occur even if the memory of what happened was exactly the same. The change may surface in the way the story is packaged and performed – particularly in terms of how tellers attempt to present a sense of who they are – way back then when the reported events happened, or right here, in the now of the telling situation.

Another factor that could result in some change in the second story may be due to time that has elapsed between the two tellings. If the speaker has changed in significant ways between the two tellings, this change could contribute to a reinterpretation of what (actually) had happened back there and then. It could also result in reworking the “memory bank,” which would result, in turn, in a new presentation of self in the here and now. These kinds of identity changes, one could expect, often result in different narratives of what seemingly was one and the same (original) event or sequence of events. However, it should also be

cautioned that audiences exposed to those two versions are likely to note and comment on the difference, potentially pressuring the teller to give additional reasons for why or how this change could have come about.

To summarize, second tellings give an ideal opportunity to sort out these different factors and bring them back into considerations about how a sense of self is put together ("claimed") and reworked at different occasions. In other words, retellings could form an ideal basis for a developmental look into the formation of self and identity. In addition, an investigation of retellings would be particularly interesting from a small story perspective, since this would imply the necessity to pay close attention to the contextual and local detail within which the participants at the storytelling occasion are positioning the characters in the there-and-then in order to position a sense of self in the here-and-now of the telling context.

2 Material

Following Shweder et al. (2006), the perfect material for an empirical inquiry into the topic of identity formation processes would be the twice-told tales of the same person over a period of time. We assume that children or adolescents don't "have a life" – or at least a life story and the identity that in big story research is assumed to go along with it – so it would be fascinating to use stories of the (seemingly) same experiences that reflect the different stages in the formation process of the child's/adolescent's identity. Similarly, we could collect the stories (again, about the same experiences) before a client started his/her therapy with the story after the therapy had ended and (hopefully) find a difference in terms of the identity claims in these two stories. However, the data I will work with in this chapter are different.

The twice-told tale under scrutiny in this chapter comes from a woman, approximately in her early forties, who in 1972 told two versions to the camera of filmmaker Liane Brandon¹ at basically the same time and location: once before noon, the second time in the afternoon. The story in both versions is, it could be argued, *exactly* the same: Betty tells how she was invited to the Governor's ball, needed a dress, shopped for it, and bought it. The dress was really beautiful and it was said to have transformed her sense of her attractiveness/beauty. However, she lost the dress shortly after it had been bought, which she claimed caused her quite a bit of distress. However, she bought another dress and went to the ball. Comparing the two versions in terms of how they are told and performed, they drastically differ. In the version that is presented first, Betty comes across to the audience as "witty, engaging, and delightful," while in the second, she is perceived as "withdrawn, sad, and vulnerable." At least, these are the characterizations the viewer can read in the catalogue that advertises the video cassette.

¹ *Betty Tells Her Story* is available from New Day Films, 190 Route 17M, P.O. Box 1084, Harriman, NY 10926 or online via <http://www.newday.com>. The copyright of *Betty Tells Her Story* is with Liane Brandon (1972), renewed 2000. Excerpts are reprinted with permission of Liane Brandon.

The question that is typically asked is, what is it that may have caused the second version to be different from the first? What has happened, either in the course of telling it the first time or between the two telling occasions? And in order to give a tentative answer, we typically seek more information about the occasioning of the two tellings. Here is what we know: The filmmaker, Liane Brandon, had become more to know the teller Betty, had heard the story about her losing her dress at a previous occasion, and asked Betty whether she would tell this story "on camera." Thus, against this background, we can start from the assumption that the two tellings should have turned out pretty much identical: The instructions to the teller of the story can be assumed to be much the same. In both cases the teller designs an anonymous recipient who has not heard this story before; we can assume further that within the course of a few hours between the morning and the afternoon, the teller has not undergone an identity transformation that could result in drastic changes between the two versions presented in front of the camera. In addition, the actual story that surfaces in both tellings has been told by the same speaker at multiple occasions. A previous telling was actually the reason why Betty was invited to perform her story in front of the camera. Actually, as we also found out from the filmmaker, the second telling – which in reality was the *third* telling on the same day² – was the attempt to capture on film just another version very much the same. In other words, we have good grounds to assume that the filmmaker, the person behind the camera who could count as a potential audience, though different from the hypothetical, generalized audience "behind the camera," did not expect a radically different story.

In sum then, we would expect that Betty, the storyteller, will design herself as quite the same person telling her story and that she will design the audience in very much the same way. We would also expect that these two factors will coincide in the very same design of the story, possibly with a few small variations here and there that we then could further scrutinize in terms of having "better" access to memory (due to the two previous tellings on the *same* occasion), and "linguistic packaging strategies."³ We should not expect a different telling that could result in the impression of the audience/spectator of two different designs of Betty as the speaker/teller. Or at least, if we were to hear two quite different stories in this kind of set-up, we would begin to speculate about the teller's *stability*.⁴

Having two versions of Betty's story, both told the same day and under very similar circumstances, calls for a detailed analysis that will avoid the pitfalls of

² The two versions of Betty's story are actually the first and third version. A second version was later discarded due to too much noise that overlapped with the filming. The fact that there were actually several versions was due to a standard technique that film makers employed before we had access to instant replays with video recordings.

³ Linguistic "packaging" is a term that refers to the formatting of concrete permutations and paraphrases in the context of tellers' linguistic performance. It is not that these performances cannot be tied to the interactional business performed between speakers and listeners and the co-construction business between them. However, a number of aspects of the packaging devices used may also reflect linguistic patterns.

⁴ And that's actually what happened: Upon viewing the two versions in one of our classes, one of the students commented that Betty was in urgent need of therapy ("Oh my God; she needs therapy").

using the first as the platform for the second as deviating from it. In other words, the question of what motivated the teller to tell the second version differently does not have to be based on assumptions about a real or more authentic version of Betty's story as well as of Betty as a person. What makes the two versions different from everyday interactions but also quite different from interview narratives is that Betty is asked to perform her story for an imagined audience – an audience that is coming from different backgrounds, with potentially quite different expectations, and an audience that is “timeless”, that is, watching Betty tell her stories still 35 years later. In that sense, Betty's stories are far from small stories: they are pretty long, not everyday-kinds of stories, and not embedded in an everyday-kind-of interactional context. Rather, Betty's two stories resemble big stories. And one could argue that the elicitation conditions are probably even more contrived and “Sunday-conditions” (cf. Freeman 2006) than those used in narrative interviews. Nevertheless, I will try to bring to bear the methods of small story analysis to the two versions in order to document i) that small story analysis can be extended and applied to big stories; and ii) how small story analysis can reveal aspects of identity analysis that big story analysis has difficulties documenting.

Before I turn to the analytic portion of this chapter, let me attend to an analysis that has been carried out previously with a portion of the same data by Elliot Mishler (2004), who introduced me to Betty's story in the year 2002 at one of our Narrative Study Group meetings at his home. He actually ended his article by inviting his colleagues to join in with more analytic work on the two versions of Betty's story, which I hereby intend to follow up on.

To briefly summarize, Mishler contrastively compares excerpts from the two versions by use of a transcription method that segments the recordings into idea units (*lines*), *stanzas*, and *strophes*, which ultimately leads up to larger *episodic* segments. He works through a number of episodes and tries, in a very reader-friendly way, to pinpoint those contrasts that are “telling” by revealing the *important* differences between the two versions. The analysis is mainly concerned with differences in lexical and syntactic choices and noting deviations from the first version as additions or subtractions. At the end, he summarizes the analysis: “The first [version] is a performance piece, a story that Betty has told before, for which she has a title, and which she knows elicits some sort of ‘ooing and aahing’ response” (Mishler 2004, p. 118). Mishler's overall characterization of Betty's second version rests very much on the interpretation of the filmmaker, who believes that the difference between the two versions is due to a question of hers right before Betty's second telling that may have led Betty to reflect more on her feelings back then when she lost her dress. Mishler writes: “The second [version] is in response to a direct question, one that carries an evaluation of the first telling as lacking something – as being ‘upbeat’ and not expressing her feelings” (Mishler 2004, p. 118). Mishler adds on that in this second version Betty appears to “confront herself,” questioning her previous version from the perspective of an internal dialogue in which she has doubts and needs to figure out the “real meaning” of the events back then.

I will take two points of departure from Mishler's analysis. Although I find it interesting that his overall interpretation of the difference between the two versions is built on the dialogic situation, that is, the context of what conversationally went on around the two tellings (just as suggested by small story analysis), it is imported into his analysis from "outside the data."⁵ In addition, it seems to take the second version as a deviation from the first version, one that is shot through with the teller's reflections, revealing more of her deeper, inner self.⁶ In contrast, in our analysis we will first analyze each version independently. Only after having given each its full interpretive attention, will we launch into a comparison between the two versions. In addition, we will try to pay closer attention to the actual wording and display features in order to be able to better differentiate between what she says, how she says it, and the action displays that go along with both. For instance, when Betty says "*and I remember*," we will not simply assume that she remembers, as Mishler seems to suggest (p. 107), but that something additional may be going on: Since she can be assumed to remember all the events that she mentions and only a few get explicitly marked as "remembered," the explicit marking of those "remembered" may turn out to be quite relevant. In short, we intend to perform a small story, microanalytic analysis on this seemingly monologic data. More concretely, we intend to lay open the interactional positioning strategies in both versions of this episode: how Betty the teller positions herself as a character in the events back-there-and-then and how she positions herself to an imagined audience. In weaving these two repertoires together, positions a sense of self - one that differs in the two versions she tells.

3 Telling and Retelling Betty's Story

Before describing the analytic steps in more detail, let me briefly return to the issue of tellings and retellings. In the course of working with Betty's story with my students, I have tried out a small experiment. I have shown the two versions in reverse order and asked students to comment on the two versions. I will

⁵ We as analysts do not have access to what Betty said after the performance of her first telling; nor do we have access to the film maker's instructions right before either of the tellings. What Mishler (and I) have is a retrospective framing by the filmmaker of how *she* makes sense and "explains" the difference between the two versions. This does not mean that the filmmaker was wrong. She was at the scene and reports from her memory what she believed had happened. However, I would suggest that this is a version - just like Mishler's and just like my own. Rather than starting from the filmmaker's interpretation, I think it would be more interesting to work first with the text and then see whether my analysis is in agreement with the additional information that we admit to further analysis from other sources.

⁶ I should hasten to add that Mishler objects to the interpretation that this second version presents or represents a "truer" sense of who Betty "really" is. Rather, Mishler takes these two versions to be examples of "multiple selves" - selves that lurk in narrative data taken in multiple stories, selves that we may miss when we just elicit and work with one story, however big it is.

abbreviate the results here since the details of this “experiment” are published elsewhere (Bamberg, 2007c). In short, students who saw version A first, followed by version B – as in Liane Brandon’s original version – tended to give credit for the transformation to the first telling; In the first telling, Betty the teller realized that she had not resolved the experience back then. She thought about it more deeply and this type of reflection resulted in the second version. Students who saw version B first, followed by version A, that is, those who saw the two versions in the reverse order, argued similarly that the first telling caused the second telling to be different. Here, however, Betty used her first telling productively in the sense that she realized in the process of her first telling that the loss of her dress was not important to who she “really” is. Consequently, her second telling (which originally is her *first* telling) gives a clearer sense of her “true self.”

A number of lessons are noteworthy from this radically simple “experiment”: i) viewers are looking for reasons in terms of how the first telling *results* in the second as different; ii) they hear the first telling as *first*, in other words, they do not realize or are able to imagine that this story has been told many, many times before, and that it exists in multiple versions way before the “*first*” telling; iii) they tend to hear the second version as *truer* and *more authentic* or *real*; and iv) they tend to attribute a “healing power” to the tellings of stories that can lead up to restorying and revision processes. While this is not the place to reflect and debate why this is so, I nevertheless want to draw attention to the dangers of these interpretive procedures,⁷ particularly when they infiltrate our analytic work and our attempts to listen and be open to potential multiplicities of people as their own historians of the self (cf. Mishler 2004).

4 Analysis

4.1 First Analysis – Top-Down

In the first step of our analysis, we are collapsing the two versions and ask: What is the story/plot? What is it about? And what makes it tellable? In this first analytic approach, we collapse both versions into what is common to them, that is, *the story or plot line*.

It appears as if the sequence of events starts with the invitation to the Governor’s ball, *setting the scene* or *orientation* for the *problem/complication*, which is having to get something to wear for the occasion. However, in spite of the fact

⁷ This may sound contradictory: How can we promote interpretation and at the same time be weary to interpretations, especially those that seem to impose a plot structure onto these two slices of everyday life (cf. Crossley 2003; Sarbin 1986)? However, the point here is that the imposition of a particular plot may rule out other possibilities – possibilities that need to be explored first, and then, subsequently, weighed vis-à-vis each other and substantiated with fine-grained analytic observations.

that not everyone gets invited to the Governor's ball, this is hardly a tellable event. And it becomes clear with the abstract given beforehand and the way the events unravel that this is not the story itself, but a pre-story that is setting the scene for another *complication*. Being the owner of a pretty dress (one that transforms Betty into a beauty), she manages to lose the dress, presenting a new or second *complication*. This in turn results in a new goal-plan, to search for the lost dress. However, when the search does not result in a (positive) *resolution*, she has to buy another dress. She does exactly that and goes to the Governor's ball, resulting in the resolution to the first, second, and overall *complication*.

However, segmenting Betty's story in terms of these story-structure units would do injustice to what this story seems to be all about, which is the transformation from a state of non-beauty into a state of having beauty and the subsequent loss of this beauty.⁸ If we take this to be the dominant plot, the story follows the structural unfolding of

not having <beauty> → *having* <beauty> → *not having* <beauty>

where different accentuations are possible: i) the setting/orientation to the story consists of a state of *not having beauty* that "miraculously" results in a (new) state of *finding/having beauty* (with a subsequent event of losing it again); or, alternatively, where the setting/orientation consists of having found beauty (after not having had it) and losing this beauty, as the resultant state. In other words, the main weight for telling the story can rest on the first two events or on the second two. And as a third possibility, it also can be equally distributed across all three subsequent events:

<i> *not having* <beauty> → *having* <beauty> → not having <beauty>

<ii> not having <beauty> → *having* <beauty> → *not having* <beauty>

<iii> *not having* <beauty> → *having* <beauty> → *not having* <beauty>

Accent <i> would focus on the transformation from something the narrator does not have but wants, how this transformation happened, and what this transformation means to the narrator in the here-and-now of the telling situation. Returning back to the original state of not having (but maybe wanting) would be peripheral.

Accent <ii> would focus on the loss of something that the narrator had (and wanted to have), resulting in something that really is undesirable. The focus of this story would be on the losing end, how this came about, what that loss (not having what is desired) means to the narrator, and how it transpires into the here-and-now of the telling situation.

Accent <iii> would focus on something that is more of a cyclical nature: where the original state (not having + wanting) was changed into its opposite (of having

⁸ Again, this does not become apparent if our analysis remains at the global level. Only a more fine-grained analysis of how Betty tells these segments can (and will) make this apparent.

+ not needing to want anymore) and then, subsequently, changed back again to its original state (not having + wanting) and how this cycle is currently relevant for the moment of telling this story.

What becomes apparent in this first and more global approach to Betty's story is that the sequence of events, meaning the plot or story, is tellable for different reasons. Reminiscent of the Cinderella story, though obviously not with a happy ending, Betty's story needs a second look, one that reveals more of the subjective orientation and accent that *she* gives in the way she lays out, unfolds, and ultimately performs in her two tellings. Nevertheless, this first approach has opened up a level of interpretation that argues for more. Betty's story is not simply about buying a dress, losing it, and buying a new one that isn't quite the same as the first. The dress and the beauty it seemingly has lent her stands for something else; it has allegoric potential. Let me speculate at this point that these three different accentuations all at some deeper level stand for some reaffirmation of a personal or group value around issues of "beauty," and more generally, its dilemmatic nature: While attractiveness and beauty on one hand are considered valuable and desirable, they are ephemeral and dispensable when compared to other values. Thus, what may be reflected in the thematization of this dilemma in Betty's story is the question of what is *really* relevant in life. We also need to be open to the consideration that she orients her audiences differently in her differing versions.

In addition, both versions of the story position the audience in a very similar way: We are left with the (hanging) question: What if? – What if Betty back-then-and-there would *not* have lost her dress? What would have happened? Who would she be here-and-now, or at least, how would she present herself? In other words, both versions end up in a very similar way with the invitation for some form of empathy: "poor Betty" – and we wished it had turned out in some form of a happy ending.

4.2 *Fine-Grained Analysis – Bottom-Up*

Within this section I will present the microanalytic procedures that contribute to some deeper understanding of how Betty as the teller orients her audience in terms of her very own, subjective way toward an understanding of the sequence of events, their potential allegoric meaning, and to how Betty makes sense of herself in the two here-and-nows of the two story-telling situations. Since we do not have any data of what goes on before and after each of the tellings, that is, we do not know how the story was contextually embedded, we cannot analyze the story along those lines. We only have the two versions in terms of how Betty orchestrates the text, her audience, and ultimately, herself. In light of space constraints, I will only analyze one of the episodes in more depth, the second episode in which Betty tries on the dress, feels transformed, and buys it. However, unless this episode differs substantially in terms of narrative positionings from the other episodes, which we trust is not the case, the analysis will serve as an exemplar in terms of how to do this type of microanalytic analysis – and, in addition, how it

reveals insights as a tool for analyzing Betty's identities in the two tellings and identity analysis in general.

Let me start by listing the event-clauses for the two versions, version A and version B, for this segment of the story, episode 2. This is followed by a small story analysis of version A, followed by a small story analysis of version B, which I then will pull together for some comparisons of the two versions that enrich our interpretive understanding of Betty's accomplishments.

VERSION A (435 words)

Event-Line:

I went off to this dress shop
 I walked in the door
 a lady emerged
 she said . . .
 and I said . . .
 and she asked . . .
 and she suggested . . .
 she emerged (with three dresses)
 I went into a dressing room
 I tried it <a dress> on
 I got very nervous
 I called up my friend
 she came down
 she saw me in the dress
 and said (you have to buy it)
 I bought the dress
 and I watched (the wrapping process)
 I carried it out of there

VERSION B (220 words)

Event-Line:

I went into that shop
 they brought three dresses out to me
 (and I remember) trying them on
 (and I remember) feeling transformed
 I bought the dress
 and I left there

4.3 Episode 2 – Version A

The narrative clauses of episode 2 of version A (overall: 18) are relatively few when compared to the total number of clauses (overall: 58), indicating that most of the clauses are coordinate or free clauses. And indeed, as the analysis will reveal, most clauses are employed to depict the descriptive details of spatial layouts and the specifics of her feeling states. Overall, there seem to be three parts to this episode, i) the description of the shop and its inventory, including the sales staff, as an exquisite and special place; ii) the characterization of the dress and the effect of this dress on her; and iii) the transaction of making this dress hers and her ambiguity about this transaction. We will work through these three parts of this episode individually in the attempt to show how Betty, the teller, positions the character Betty, in the there-and-then, to show how she positions herself as the person in the here-and-now of the documentary in version A.

Betty starts the episode temporally framing her whereabouts relative to the preceding temporal events (*one afternoon*). All events referred to within this

episode take place within this temporal frame, but more important, all events within this temporal envelope take place at the same location toward which she orients the listener. To be more precise, she takes "off" from some unspecified origo (which could be her school or her home) "to this dress shop."⁹ However, before the event-line actually gets her there, she steps out of the event-line and comments on the experience (*the whole thing*) of when she "walked in the door" – from an explicitly evaluative orientation: "*the whole thing was yaknow a real surprise for me.*" The device of foreshadowing what is to come next by use of an overarching, evaluative statement typically prepares an audience for the delivery of more explicating detail. Again, Betty does not immediately follow up on this. Before she characterizes "this shop" in more detail and explicates her "surprise," she sets this experience up *ex negativo vis-à-vis* "Filenes Basement," a culturally shared icon of department store, where things are ordinary and predictable. Her use of "you know" (2 times) in this context invites the confirmation of the audience for her attempt to distinguish "this shop" as very different from our usual and ordinary imagination. The descriptive detail about "this store," consisting of "just plush carpet," "beautiful dove gray walls," "an appropriate dress once in a while" – culminating in the overall characterization of the location as "hush shadows." This sets the scene to position the first character in this episode – "a lady emerges," who is further characterized as "sort of dove gray" with a "sort of dove gray voice." Initializing both turns by use of hesitation markers (*um* and *well*), Betty as the narrator positions herself as customer and the shop lady as cautiously and politely dialoguing, resulting in the creation of a customer-staff relationship that is different from the norm.

It is of interest that the characteristic "dove gray" was first used to spatially characterize the walls that hold this shop together, and from there is extended to position the personal character of the shop lady as "dove gray lady" with her "dove gray voice." Further, constructing her as "emerging" from the "hush shadows" of the "dove gray walls" positions this shop lady as part of what seems to be belonging intrinsically to this location. Furthermore, depicting the location and its personal inventory as *gray*, a noncolor in between white and black, marks objects, but in particular people, with this characteristic as "indistinguishably distinguishable." They stand out and are marked as different from traditional, common, and predictable places and their inventory. In other words, while gray is by no means a color or tone that is extraordinary, Betty, the narrator, uses *gray* to stylize the sales staff in this story as part of the location which is exquisite and special.

Turning to the second segment of this episode, the characterization of the dress and the transforming effect of the dress, it becomes clear that the extensive characterization of the location and its inventory as "gray" fittingly serves to set the background against which the "beautiful emerald green dress" can stand out as "absolutely exquisite." No wonder that Betty, when she "tried it on," can describe

⁹ Note that *this dress shop* becomes *that shop* in version 2.

her feeling state after all this rhetorical build up as “*glamorous*” – and, elaborating on it, “*it was just the most incredible feeling I ever had in my life.*” And as if this was not sufficient, she appeals to the audience (*yaknow*) for confirmation for this totally unexpected (*sudden*) transformation seemingly topping the previous generalization with two even more extreme formulations: “*I don’t think I ever in my whole life felt pretty until then*” and “*it was like a fairy story from my childhood.*” This string of extreme case formulations (*most incredible, ever in my life, ever in my whole life, like a fairy story*) serves the purpose of characterizing and underscoring the uniqueness of this moment. It becomes clear that this moment, which forms the high point of this episode, could not have been inserted into the story line without a good amount of rhetoric preparation. Along a similar vein, the story could not continue after the rhetoric construction of this all-encompassing, life changing turning point with a simple monetary transaction resulting in making this dress hers and living a life of beauty thereafter. In order to begin to grasp the relevance of Betty’s rhetorical construction of the high point, let us step back for a second: Let us imagine Betty had constructed this same transformational high point with an ordinary set up such as “I needed a dress, went to a dress shop, saw this beautiful dress and tried it on” – followed by the lines forming the high point in this segment. Or imagine she continued after this high point with something like “I decided to buy this dress, went to the ball, and . . .” Any of these versions would be out of place and simply not “go along” with the way Betty instructs her audience to construct the relevance of the transformation that seemingly took place at this dress shop. What seems already to linger is an allusion that something else is equally relevant for the continuation of the plot that is emerging: This is not a story solely about a life transforming moment: something else is going on.

This kind of allusion becomes more strongly supported by the way Betty puts together the third and last segment of this episode. Positioning herself as having been benefited as if in a fairy tale, she continues with another reference to a feeling state: “*I got very nervous.*” However, with her next clause, the question of what may have caused this feeling becomes clarified: it is the upcoming financial transaction. The price to pay to make this dress her own (and make herself beautiful?) is “*out of proportion and youknow not very right to spend that.*” In other words, Betty, the teller, presents the Betty, back then, in a moral dilemma: Not that she wasn’t able to afford it; but, to buy this dress for this price wasn’t “*right.*” To resolve this dilemma, she reports in a side story that she drew on her friend (the one “*who had suggested the place*”), made her come to the location, and only after receiving her explicit advice decided to engage in the transaction. Still, she positions herself as not having bought the dress if it hadn’t been for this friend (*against my better judgment*) and leaving the store in ambivalence (*sort of at the same time kind of all excited and very guilty*). What exactly seemed to have been causing this guilt remains unclear. While the guilt factor was first brought up when she recognized the price tag that came along with the dress, it also seems to be the packaging and the way this dress was exquisitely tailored for her. This, at least, seems to be insinuated by letting the listener into her mind (back then and there)

when she elaborates in detail the scene in which she watches how this dress is prepared to become hers (*and I watched while they wrapped it up in pink tissue paper and put it into a pink box that said Miss Lynch's on it*). Explicating her state of ambivalence immediately after this scene contributes significantly to the impression that there is more than just the financial tag that causes her state of ambivalence. Although this is not spelled out in any detail, the listener is likely to extend the uneasiness about the price to other aspects of the transaction, such as owning it but also simply to loving the dress (and the effect that she feels the dress has on her) and potentially even coming to this shop and feeling special there.

To summarize, Betty the teller seems to find it relevant to refer explicitly to three characters in this episode, the Betty back-then, the shop lady, and Betty's friend. All of them have "faces"; they are characterized with a number of concrete attributes. In addition, all three speak with their own voices, and both the shop lady and friend "serve" Betty back-then in finding a place to buy a desirable dress that transforms her into a beautiful woman. They also assist her buying this dress and taking it away as her own. Betty, the teller, characterizes herself back-then as coming out of this episode in a state of ambivalence – owning it but not really wanting to own it, feeling both proud and guilty. Retrospectively, although not explicitly mentioned, there may have been more than one factor that contributed to her ambivalence. However, what exactly caused this ambivalence and how this potentially unsettling feeling could ultimately be turned around, remains somewhat unresolved. It leaves the audience in need for more information, a continuation of the story and seeking for the possibility of a resolution.

4.4 Episode 2 – Version B

Betty, the teller, starts the second episode by foreshadowing aspects of the overall experience in this episode, such as at the location that she subsequently details in order to back up this evaluative orientation. It may be of interest that she begins this episode by explicitly marking it as a memory (*and I remember*); she claims (in the here-and-now) to be clear about the overall impression she had back there and then. We have two other explicit references to her memory in the course of this episode and will be able to structurally and functionally say more about why narrators occasionally make reference to what they say has happened in the form of internal constructs of memories.¹⁰ Following Betty's structural

¹⁰ Introducing an event or descriptive detail from some point back in time by the marker "*and I remember*" does several things in a narrative. At the most literal level, it lays open and thereby demarcates that there is a gap between the speaker/teller who is doing the remembering in the here-and-now and that what is referred to next as having taken place in the there-and-then. While the activity of narrating is built on this gap, memory is automatically and always invoked. In other words, remembering is the default case and it goes without saying: When I tell a story, it is unnecessary, if the narrative flow is not interrupted, to refer to each event as memories. Thus, when tellers make explicit that they are remembering, particularly if they do this repeatedly, something else must be implicated.

layout of the second episode, the number of narrative clauses demarcating the skeleton of this episode is the bare minimum of five (see above). Considering that this episode is almost half in terms of its length of the comparative episode of version A, the free clauses in this version even more radically outweigh the narrative clauses.

Having foreshadowed what is happening in this episode from an overall vantage point as a "*strange thing*," Betty, the teller, positions the there-and-then Betty already at the point of entering "*that shop*"¹¹ as feeling "*uncomfortable*": "*there was something uhm uncomfortably plush and posh about the whole thing.*" The shop is further characterized as "*quiet*" and "*cathedral like*", thus likening it to a place that requires being honored by respectfulness and reverence. In line with the requirements that follow from the way the location is characterized, the "*ladies*" who serve their customers are described as "*soft spoken*." It is of interest that the characters in this episode are introduced as "*ladies*" in the form of a plural marking. "*They*" bring out the dresses and their actions result in some overall impression on Betty's part of being "*treated like a queen*." Furthermore, "*everything*" in this location "*looked very expensive*." The metaphorical field that is invoked, the grandness of a cathedral, the nobleness and preciousness, and the deference and reverence that go along with them in terms of the kinds of actions at this location, is self-contained and coherent. If this is "*the whole thing*" Betty alludes to at two occasions early in this episode, it comes along with the evaluative orientation of "*strange*" and "*uncomfortable*."

Turning back to the dresses, what Betty "*remembers*" next is "*trying them on*," particularly the one she singles out and describes in more detail (*emerald-green with chiffon panels that floated down the back*). Here it seems as if Betty's removal from the event-line of what happened there and then and explicitly referring to the events as her memories (*and I remember*) demarcates a new episodic segment, namely the experience of transforming into looking "*pretty*," as she calls it a few moments later. Again, before she gets to this point, she dwells and elaborates on the moment of putting on this dress. She rhetorically removes herself from the storyline and relates what is happening at this moment to a generalized experience of being in a "*beauty parlor*," "*having your hair done*." The function of this analogy is to relate to the audience what those two experiences have in common: both make her "*feel uncomfortable*." This analogy is prefaced by "*and I don't know*"; that is, Betty, the teller, comments reflectively on the there-and-then of what was happening, and she positions herself as one who does "*not know*," as one who can not clearly relate to the audience what was happening. In addition to characterizing herself as uncomfortable, she also characterizes her experience of wearing this beautiful dress as "*kind of special*" and "*luxurious*."

At this point she again drops the line of the there-and-then events, steps out and refers to herself in the here-and-now as remembering (*and I remember*); what

¹¹ Note that "*that shop*" was "*this shop*" in version A. The difference between these two deictics ("that" and "this") is one of marking one's stance in terms of proximity/distance. "*This*" is closer than "*that*."

she says she “remembers” “*looking in the mirror*” (back there and then), and “*feeling suddenly kind of transformed or something*.” In addition to marking this explicitly as memories, Betty, the teller, also embeds the actual transformation into two hedges, “*kind of*” and “*or something*.” So while she is clear about the moment – it stands out very explicitly in her memory, so she says – she presents herself as somewhat unclear, or at least uncommitted, about the feeling that went along with this transformation. In other words, she claims that she does not know how to translate the change of events into her internal feeling states. The reason for this, she claims further, is “*because I never looked that way before*.” Thus, this transformation is not only somewhat unusual but also totally unexpected. And the way Betty, the teller, positions Betty, in the there-and-then, as *thinking* that she “*looked pretty*” signals that she as the teller in the here-and-now is somewhat distanced and maybe skeptical about what really went on back there-and-then in “*that*” shop.

“*Well*,” she “*bought the dress*” (even though it cost far too much). Betty leaves the shop “*with very mixed feelings*” “*about having bought the dress*,” as she claims. However, in light of her repeated characterizations (spread across the whole episode) of “*the whole thing*” making her feel “*uncomfortable*,” it is clearly not just the prize of the dress that results in these mixed feelings. Just like being at the beauty parlor, Betty, the teller, positions Betty, the character in the there-and-then, as “*out-of-place*” in this shop, as “*out-of-character*” wearing the dress, and, as she says at the end, also “*out-of-her-league*” in terms of what she had to pay. However, she also alludes to something more positive in this chain of thoughts and feelings, and this is feeling “*luxurious*” and “*special*.”

To summarize, Betty, the teller, positions herself as character in the story events as “*not herself*” – her “*real*” self does not “*fit*”: into the shop, into the dress, and into the role of the final owner of the dress. The other characters in this episode (they only exist in the anonymous plural as “*the ladies*” and “*they*”) are positioned as relatively faceless (though seemingly very polite – they treated her like a queen). There were no individual characters whom Betty, the teller, holds to be relevant enough to specify individually in any way so that Betty, the character, could be related to them. Everyone mentioned remains relatively relationless. Betty, the teller, reports very few actions or activities; instead she lists her feelings, thoughts, and, as she explicitly says, memories. Even the analogy of going to the beauty parlor is a rhetoric device to explicate her feelings and not her actions. Her frequent use of hedges (*I don't know, kind of, or something*) and her continuous interruptions of the event-line by reflecting on what happened from her point of view as the teller in the here-and-now give the impression as if she as the teller is involved in some form of internal dialogue, as if she is speaking to herself. Consequently, what the audience is more likely to take away from this episode is the impression that Betty, the teller, cannot (or is not willing to) let the actions of the story speak for themselves. She, as the narrator, is very invested in the interpretation of what happened. The here-and-now and the back-there-then are not clearly distinguishable; or, in terms of traditional story theory, the ending of the story and/or the complication or dilemma have not been resolved.

4.5 *Comparison of Version A and Version B of Episode 2*

To be clear from the start, an episode of a story that revolves centrally about the buying of a dress is most likely not an opportunity to launch into the actions and activities of characters and their development. What we would expect, though, as necessary components, are movements to and from the store and, if the transaction is successful, receiving the dress in exchange for payment. Everything else, such as finding the right dress and dialoguing with the salespeople, which most likely are bound to happen, may not necessarily be noteworthy. Thus, what is it that is tellable or particularly noteworthy in an episode with this specific theme?

In light of these considerations, it is noteworthy that Betty, the teller, is able to weave episode 2 of version A into something that sounds like a story: Betty, the character, enters the shop; the shop itself is unusual; unexpected things happen in this shop; the audience is following Betty the character's gaze at that location; Betty ends up buying a dress; and, she leaves with mixed feelings about the financial end of the transaction. In addition, the teller successfully insinuates that this mixed feeling is a construct that orients the audience toward more to come: the overall story is not over yet; this was just an episode leading up to more to come. In other words, version A successfully interweaves action orientation and evaluation. The teller positions characters in time and space, all orienting in concert toward the overall revelation of the story as a whole, that is, how what happened back then is relevant to the here-and-now and thereby reveals how she wants to be understood. In addition, Betty, the teller, successfully engages the audience in the development of story expectations that go along with this.

In a similar fashion, the teller of episode 2 of version B also succeeds in signaling that this section is part of some preceding and consecutive story work. However, this segment has less episodic character. It is more likely to be heard as a list of memories in service of the teller's position vis-à-vis herself. The world of characters, particularly the world of Betty, the character in the there-and-then, is much less developed compared to version A. In contrast, in version B the audience has much more direct access to how Betty, the teller, positions herself back-there-and-then vis-à-vis herself here-and-now. In other words, the identity work that narratives typically accomplish is more direct. Betty is not addressing or involving the audience in the world of characters and their development. She seemingly talks with herself; we, the audience, are overhearing and witnessing this dialogue. What is of interest is that it has the contour of a dialogue, rather than a monologue, since the telling seems to consist of a struggle for positions – or, to put it differently, it is hearable as a quest for a coherent position, a quest in which Betty, the teller, is making use of Betty, the character back-then, in order to find out more about herself – of who she is in the here-and-now.

The difference between the two versions of episode 2 becomes more transparent when we consider the way evaluative detail is constructed and managed in the course of its delivery. Whereas version A manages to deliver the evaluative orientation throughout the episode through the lens of Betty, the character, the teller of version B mixes character and narrator positions. Let me exemplify this:

In version A the spatial detail in the shop is arranged in such a way that the audience feels as though it is being led through the shop step-by-step by Betty, the character, in the there-and-then. In addition, the verbal exchanges between the shop lady and Betty and also with Betty's friend, who arrives at the scene, are replayed as if they took place exactly this way. When Betty relates what the transformation into a beautiful woman meant to her, it is as if we hear the Betty, then-and-there, (in the dressing room) and only secondarily the narrator, Betty, who speaks in the here-and-now. It is as if, metaphorically speaking, the character, Betty, has a grip on Betty, the teller, where the teller follows the character. In contrast, Betty, the teller of version B, initially sets up the character, Betty, but only to take her back, to continuously interfere, and ultimately to be in control of the character, Betty. While it could have been the situation back then, due to all its alleged strangeness, which made Betty uncomfortable in the there-and-then, this reading is not developed in version B. Betty, the teller, presents Betty, the character, already as knowledgeable about the strangeness of the place before she even enters and as knowledgeable of how the sequence of events only can turn out negatively. This kind of attitude is omnipresent throughout episode 2 of version B. Betty, the character, is shot through with the attitude of Betty looking at it from the here-and-now.

To summarize, comparing the two versions of episode 2, the viewer of the documentary ends up with two versions of Betty: A Betty in version A who is open to new situations and has potential for character development; this Betty is also a person who is socially connected but willing to engage in newness and challenges if backed up "with a little help from her friends." Betty does not present herself as a cosmopolitan woman who knows the world of fashion; rather, she needs the help and advice of a friend. However, with this advice, she is willing to explore new territory and discover aspects about herself that previously were hidden for her. Although her character is presented not necessarily as heroic and adventurous, it is nevertheless *she*, herself, who is in charge of her own actions. In short, Betty, the character, is depicted as "curious." This type of character depiction is severely dampened in version B. The character, Betty, in version B is a person who is continuously self-reflecting, not comfortable in a situation that is potentially new to her and that affords challenges. In addition, she is constructed as alone. There is no one in version B who comes to Betty's assistance. She is an individual, alone in a strange and ultimately faceless world of others. And although it appears as if Betty in version B acts out of her own will, this will is shot through by doubt and hesitation, knowing that none of this should be happening and all this is bound to be doomed.

5 Summary and Discussion

It may seem that the analysis of the two versions of episode 2 has led us dangerously close to the ascription of two different identities of the same person, Betty, the teller in the here-and-now, of the recording 35 years ago. However, let me be

clear that the above small story analysis is not aiming to reveal Betty's identity, particularly her "real" identity, as the description in the catalogue claims, and as some of my student viewers would like to have it. It also is not about ascribing different or multiple identities to Betty, the teller. My contribution tackles the question how Betty hails two different subjectivities (or "identities", if you want to) into being. Or better, my analysis explores the construction means that Betty uses as the teller of the two versions that others use to assign "multiple identities" to her.

Let me attempt to clarify. When watching Liane Brandon's full video for the first time, the viewer typically is somewhat unsettled. The question then needs to be raised, what is it that causes this unsettlement? And further, what causes the viewer to launch into rationales that could "explain" the change from version A to version B? And more specifically, why are these rationales typically looking for something that "happened" either in the previous (first) telling or in between the two tellings? It is not only that these strategies to explain the differences between the two versions are common among students who watch the full video for the first time, but also, even the filmmaker herself, and Mishler (after he performed his analysis of the two versions) are in need of such explanations. Why does it not seem to be possible to simply accept that people tell their stories differently at different times, even if the result is that they hail two different subjectivities into being?

I have no clear answer to these questions. However, I want to stay as far away as possible from getting involved in this kind of debate, as difficult as this may be. Instead, I will focus for the rest of this chapter on what we can learn by a fine-grained (small story) analysis of the particular means that Betty exploits in her business of telling her two versions. Summarizing the narrative strategy used to accomplish version A (including the concomitant reading of Betty, the teller's, subjectivity), it is surprising how detailed the descriptions are of the spatial layout and its inventory. The narrative strategy that accomplishes the kind of reliability that goes along with this is the preferred one in the courtroom or for eyewitness testimonies in general. If the teller can accomplish drawing up a character surrounded by detail, both character and teller appear as a unit and come across as trustworthy. The listener is allowed to peek into the there-and-then through the character back-there-and-then, orchestrated by the teller. Evaluative viewpoints that are external to the there-and-then (i.e., they bring to the forefront that there is a teller in the here-and-now who actually orchestrates and potentially fabricates the world of characters) are few and they typically appear to sum up and transit to a new episode of what happened next. The narrative strategy made use of in version B relies on another kind of detail: descriptions of internal states, especially feeling states. Some of these internal states are ascribed to the characters back then, but other internal states seemingly reflect the teller's state of mind in the here-and-now. This strategy, by use of which character and teller are welded into more of a unit, often does not make it easy to differentiate between character and teller. It is as if the audience is participating in some kind of "internal monologue" of the teller. In sum, the orchestration of the character as a separate unit

in and of itself, one who has her own intentions and agency but also the ability to change and develop, is most difficult by use of the construction means that Betty the teller employed in version B. Typically, a teller using these means is not judged as reliable in the same way. It is not the facts back-there-and-then for which this strategy can vouch. Rather, version B displays another kind of reliability, one that typically is privileged in therapeutic encounters and confessions; in those institutionalized contexts the preferred term is "self-disclosure."

Thus, we find two different narrative techniques in Betty's two versions: one, displayed in version A, consisting of the orchestration of characters as actors who are open to development; the other, displayed in version B, resembling the genre of self-disclosure or confession in which the teller is attempting to sort out what was right, wrong, good, or evil back-then from the here-and-now.¹² In light of these differences, both of Betty's versions have their own credibility, which, however is the result of the use of different story means. Consequently, it is no wonder that interpreters of version A credit the teller with attributes such as "witty, engaging, and delightful." To turn back to considerations we made above, version A can be understood as accentuating more strongly the transformation from the poor teacher to a beautiful woman, downplaying the fact that this beauty was gone moments later as nothing to worry about. These moments "*tell you something that you always knew,*" she says in her introduction to version A. In contrast, version B is likely to be interpreted as a revelation of her self, which in contemporary Western psychoanalytic culture (Parker 1997, 2003) is the "true" self that confessions and the therapeutic dialogue pulls for by forcing the participant/client to reflect and revise.¹³ It appears as if Betty's focus in version B is on the latter end of the overall structure, having had beauty which was (tragically) lost; where, from the retrospect, Betty "*reveals how she really felt*" about "*a chance of a lifetime*" (her words), and the "*painfulness of the memory.*"

6 Conclusion

Since there is no final conclusion to Betty's story and her two versions, the dialogic among those who have started working with Betty's versions as data will continue. I hope to have shown with my contribution to this volume that a small story analysis that treats stories as interactive positionings can reveal new and interesting insights. The attempt was made to pull Betty's story out of the domain

¹² Of course, although the here-and-now typically is imposed onto the there-and-then, the directionality can go the other way around and a "deeper" exploration of the there-and-then can impact and alter the understanding of the here-and-now.

¹³ Again, I should clarify: There is nothing wrong with "reflection." However, it needs to be realized that the kinds of reflection that are privileged in the stylistics of version B are special kinds. Tellers who use story means of the sort that result in version A's also *reflect*. It is not that their tellings are direct, spontaneous, and unreflective, but they *appear* that way. Using such a story means lends credence to the appearance of spontaneity and unreflectiveness to the author.

of big story research and demonstrate that even narratives that appear to consist of inner dialogues are based on complex interactional strategies in which the appearance of what often is considered a more reflective and truer self are deeply embedded.

In addition, in contrast to positioning multiple selves behind different versions of Betty's story and opening them up to analysis, my contribution suggests studying the construction of identity as a process, and simultaneously, a process that is shot through by three dilemmas: i) the "*identity dilemma*," posing the question how it is possible to consider oneself as the same in the face of constant change; ii) the "*uniqueness dilemma*," whether it is possible to consider oneself as unique in the face of being the same as everyone else (and vice versa); and iii) the "*construction*" or "*who-is-in-charge dilemma*," asking whether it is the person who constructs the world the way it is or whether the person is constructed by the way the world is. Making sense of oneself by telling stories – be they big or small – is an ongoing process taking place in everyday, mundane situations before it is repeated in Sunday situations in front of a camera. Studying this ongoing process does not require an endstate from where previous stories all fall into one or several places. As Betty's versions demonstrate, not even our participants work with these assumptions when engaging in storytelling. So why should researchers jump to such conclusions?

And finally, if identities are continuously "under construction" and require analytic tools that pay dues to this process, how can we do justice to the role of our participants in this construction process? Here I want to join forces with Mishler's position: Yes, research participants – but we can probably generalize we to mean everyone, everywhere, all the time, when we engage in storytelling – "are the historians of their own lives" (Mishler 2004, p. 101). Yet the developmental telos is probably not in finding our "real," "true," or "one and only" story. And neither is it in finding a couple of *good stories* that we can download at the appropriate occasions in the form of "multiple identities." If we take the notion of "life as a continuous process" seriously, we may have to rethink qualitative methods, and narratives methods in particular, in terms of how they capture and do justice to the constant changes that take place. The study of microgenetic processes the way I have tried to demonstrate using Betty's two versions as data may be a step in that direction.

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