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Descriptive and theoretical modes

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WHAT CONSTITUTES 'GOOD' DATA FOR THE STUDY OF
LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT?

HOW CHILDREN LEARN TO TALK ABOUT THINGS WITH
NO NAME:

'Double Emotions'*

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1. *What does it mean to establish 'good' data in language acquisition research?*

1.1 *Privileging theory versus privileging data — is there another choice?*

Almost 20 years ago Annette Karmiloff-Smith and Bärbel Inhelder co-published an article in *Cognition* entitled "If You Want to Get Ahead Get a Theory" (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder 1974/75), calling on developmental psychologists, but in particular on developmental psycholinguists, to pay more attention to theoretical endeavors in contrast to empiricist listings of findings of what children achieve over time. Steven Pinker, in a similar vein, criticizes most of the research in developmental psycholinguistics as empiricist and atheoretical (Pinker 1984, 1988). His summary of what has been happening over the sixties and seventies in the field of developmental psycholinguistics sounds rather devastating: "There were studies of the speech of children at one or more stages, and of their comprehension abilities, but virtually no one paid

* Portions of the research reported in this chapter were presented at the Child Language Seminar in Manchester, England in March 1991, at the National Academy of Education Spencer Fellows Forum, Cambridge, Mass. in October 1992, and at the Eastern Education Research Association, Clearwater, Fla. in February 1993. The original research was supported by a two-year National Academy of Education Spencer Fellowship.

attention to the learning process (i.e., the process by which the child forms new rules), nor to the end state of acquisition (for example, the fact at some time between birth and adulthood people acquire the ability to differentiate *John is too tough to complain* and *John is too tough to complain to*, to take a randomly chosen subtle and complex linguistic fact). The field even took on a new name: Child Language" (Pinker 1988:100).¹ Gleason & Ratner (1993) follow a similar line of reasoning with the call to replace the study of what children 'say' by how they acquire 'language as a system', and the latter requires a theory of the structural nature of language (Gleason & Ratner 1993:303).

These three sources may suffice as representative voices within the more recent history of child language development advocating the primacy and 'privileging' of 'theory' over what can (only in a subsequent step) be considered as 'data'. The framework within which this approach to the relationship between theory and data has been constructed is nested in contemporary rationalist theorizing – where 'theory' and 'knowledge' are privileged over 'actions' and 'happenings', and where the form or method of bridging the gap between theory and data is that of hypothetical-deductive reasoning. The attitude that is constitutive of this approach is that of detachment, grounded in the assumption of a rationality that is generative of 'knowledge' – and consequently of theories that enable the organism to 'differentiate' and 'integrate' the chaos of sense impressions and experiences into categories.²

This type of rationalist framework in the more recent past of child language development research seems to have overcome and superseded an approach to the relationship between theory and data that privileged the empirical aspect of data formation. Within this 'empiricist' tradition, structures are generalized in an inductive fashion from the data, i.e., with data as their source or origin. Language is 'learnt' through observation and imitation of others. As has been argued within this framework by researchers such as Moerk (1980, 1989), maternal utterances are tailored for short (critical) periods in particular ways in order to better enable children to observe and generalize patterns. Although most researchers take Chomsky's critique of Skinner's *Verbal Behavior*

¹ In a footnote to this excerpt, Pinker tries to clarify more drastically what is supposed to be taken as 'factual' for the study of (and thus as theoretically privileged for) language development: "I continue to find it puzzling that psychologists do not consider **the facts** [our emphasis, BAS] of adult language as data that a theory of language acquisition must account for" (Pinker 1988:100).

² Compare Elias' excellent historical account of how this particular kind of **detachment** could historically **develop** in what he calls "the process of civilization" (Elias 1978, 1982, 1987).

(Chomsky 1959) to be the death-kiss to the empiricist approach to child language development, empiricism is very much alive and well in the form of our folk model of how children acquire language, and quite often sneaks back into views and claims of current language acquisition research.³ The attitude required for unbiased and value-free observations (in order to 'discover' the properties of independent and interpretation-free facts) is similar to that required by research carried out in the rationalist framework, namely one that is uninvolved and detached.

In sum, both empiricism and rationalism view data and theory as closely related, though with an opposite emphasis: While theory is privileged in the rationalist approach, data are privileged in the empiricist. In the subsequent section, we will try to present a framework that does not start with any of these two assumptions. Rather, theory and data will be viewed as consistently influencing each other, though not in an autonomous fashion. It is the act of relating both with each other that generates this influence – an act that is constituted by a subject of the research process – a subject who views him/herself as a responsible agent in a social and cultural context. Viewing the relationship between theory and data as a circular process that has no beginning and no end, but is part and parcel of the process of human understanding, may help us ultimately to give a better account of what the notion of development may imply, as well as guide our decisions of where to look for 'good' data for what we wish to document and better understand.

1.2 *The notion of development and its implication for 'good data'*

A developmental approach to language ought to take the following six issues into account: (1) the definition of LANGUAGE – or more concretely, which aspect of language is argued to constitute the 'domain' of inquiry; (2) the definition of the PERSON – or in case non-human 'language' is part of the inquiry: the 'organism'; (3) the definition of what constitutes the COURSE of development; (4) the definition of what constitutes the influential factors or MECHANISMS of development; (5) the definition of what form the end-point or TELOS of development takes; (6) a characterization of the METHODOLOGY employed in the research act. A seventh potential issue could be brought into the circle, namely the RESEARCH ACT itself, including its protagonist, the researcher him/herself and his/her social responsibility.⁴ All six (or seven)

³ To our knowledge, the power and pertinence of this folk model of language development, namely that children learn by hearing language and by imitating the adults around him/her, has thus far not sufficiently been addressed by language researchers.

⁴ The notion of a 'circle' suggests correctly that there is no a priori or privileged starting point, from which all other aspects 'fall into place'. Any of the six aspects of developmental

components are equally relevant in the constitution of a 'theory of language development', though most research has usually focused on one or two components, and left the other ones implicit and covert. In the following, we will briefly consider all six components, trying to show how they all are intertwined in their mutual constitutions, and how they all in concert can point to different interpretations of what could count as 'good' data.

(1) LANGUAGE (or the 'domain' thereof):

Apart from the traditional ways of differentiating between domains according to which language can be investigated (e.g. phonology, morphology, the lexicon, syntax, semantics, and pragmatics), there is the more basic distinction between 'language as action' versus 'language as knowledge'. Though actual language use ('language as action') seems to provide the empirical level for investigations of how the rules of languages are formed, it is nevertheless assumed by most psycholinguists that language as action is governed by 'knowledge' – knowledge of the structure that is argued to be inherent to language, and knowledge of how to employ this structure in context. Whether this knowledge of structure(s) is domain specific, and as such can be acquired independent of each other, or whether it connects between the domains is unclear and debated. Furthermore, whether at all – and if so how – knowledge can be derived by generalizing from observations from 'language as action' is also being debated, though this debate has been moved somewhat to the periphery among language acquisition researchers.

Another – often referred to as 'functional' – presupposition has crept into language acquisition research, which takes up on the issue that language is action for a communicative purpose. In line with this orientation, it is argued that children's (communicative) intentions – understood as their attempts to attain certain pragmatic goals in particular contextual settings – are relevant for how knowledge of language structure is acquired – leaving unspecified whether the communicative purpose of language may only temporarily serve as a tool to help the child 'crack' the structure, or whether the communicative purposes to which language is employed actually are identical with what is identified (at a different level of abstraction) as 'its structure'.

Turning to a brief consideration of the domain of language that will be of concern for our own investigation further below, namely that of (lexical) semantics, it does not come as a surprise to see the rationalist/empiricist split resurfacing in the form of two different approaches to 'lexical meaning'. The referential approach to language assumes at its core that terms refer to the

research may serve as the entry-point.

differentiations that are existent in nature. The ideational approach to language assumes that categories to be existent in the form of mental ideas, also called 'concepts'. Both approaches assume different learning/acquisition procedures (i.e., a different course of development), but both views gang up in the joint proposition that the relationship between referent, word and concept is the telos of what is to be acquired, before it can successfully be employed in 'language as action', i.e., in contextual settings. Again, how children make use of the contextual settings in which they 'experience' words and other people's communicative intentions, or how they make use of other knowledge domains is heavily disputed between researchers of lexical development. – We will discuss the particulars of the sub-domain of 'references to 'internal states'' and how these 'internal states' are assumed to be 'conceptualized' further below.⁵

(2) The notion of the PERSON/ORGANISM:

Having started with a rather lengthy discussion of different options when it came to delineate the domain of language acquisition research, we can be more brief in the discussion of corresponding assumptions regarding 'personhood'. Whether or not it is assumed that structure is to be found in experience or in the mind, in both cases the organism can be constructed as actively participating in the dis-/uncovery of this structure, or as more reactively operating on the basis of what is taken as given. It may come as a surprise that the 'parameter-setting' approach to language acquisition and the traditional behaviorist approach of classical or operant conditioning both presuppose a relatively uninvolved organism; a person freed from intentions, a will, and values. Though conditioning processes rely heavily on contextual factors, these factors do not facilitate the learning process due to their social or subjective meaning, but simply due to 'being there'.

Cognitive theorizing and social interactionist approaches to language acquisition usually employ a more active notion of the organism. The organism is viewed as being actively involved either in (other) cognitive 'activities', or in social interactions with other organisms. Contextual factors in terms of how they can be 'meaningfully' employed by the child within this acquisition process, may be mediated either in conceptual (i.e., cognitive) terms or in terms of categories that regulate the socially relevant interactions.

⁵ Having started with the notion of the domain should by no means misunderstood as prioritizing this aspect of doing developmental research. Any other aspect could have served equally as the starting point. For linguists, however, this point of entry seems to be more 'natural' than for instance the consideration of what ties the child into learning/acquiring language, or what we mean when we assume 'the child'.

Being actively involved vs. reacting to what is assumed to exist (either in the structure of the domain or in the structure of the organism, i.e., in its cognitive 'equipment') reflects only one dimension that displays different underlying assumptions of what the organism is assumed to be. Whether for instance the child is viewed to 'generate' hypotheses or to 'test' them, to 'map' concepts onto words (or grammatical morphemes) or to 'match' both, or whether a rule (or systematic connection) is 'internalized', or a parameter is 'accommodated', reflects this dimension to some degree; but it also reflects some more underlying differences regarding the notion of 'person' and the role of others in the constitution of 'person-hood'. In brief, most work in language acquisition thus far has regarded the language learner as a more or less 'windowless' monad. Although other psychologies give the 2-year-old child intentions, beliefs, desires, emotions, and a social self (at least in a rudimentary form), these capacities are only rarely considered as relevant for the language acquisition process.

(3) The COURSE of development:

It should go without saying that the changes that can be argued to hold for English-speaking children in their phonological development are radically different from those in their pragmatic development. However, taking the domain of lexical development, different approaches with their different presuppositions of how words are 'composed' (such as the 'semantic feature' approach vs. the 'functional core approach' vs. the 'prototype approach') come to different conclusions of how the child proceeds in his/her acquisition process. Furthermore, approaches that view lexical items more closely in relationship to their syntactic functions – in particular here the acquisition of verbs – not only realize a different course of what is acquired step-by-step, but more definitively, a different telos to which the course is geared as a whole. A hotly debated issue is whether the course of development is a continuous process of changes or one that is 'discontinuous' (cf. Bamberg, Budwig & Kaplan 1991).

(4) The TELOS of development:

The end-point, the course (targeting this end-point), and what is considered the domain (in most developmental research), are being viewed as more closely related as the notion of the organism, the mechanisms, and the methodology employed to investigate this overall relationship. To actually assume a course of changes without a telos often seems to be counterintuitive, since we know

that phases or stages only are parts of a whole, and without the conceptualization of the overall whole, its parts have no existence.⁶ For some researchers of linguistic development the formulation of the telos is the equivalent of 'Universal Grammar' which formulates and specifies the 'parameters' (or 'switches') for a number of variable features of language which set the child 'straight' in his/her maturation process.

(5) MECHANISMS:

Considering which factors instantiate the language acquisition process and keep it moving towards its telos, relates closely to assumptions that went into the notion of what or who the organism is. The assumption of underlying maturational processes for instance builds on biological assumptions that the organism brings into the language acquisition process, while the more 'active' hypothesis tester needs to rely on other (cognitive) capacities. Another way to conceive of mechanisms that give changes over time their orientation and systematic shape is in the form of particular social interactions. Whether the same mechanisms operate continuously with the same force or whether different mechanisms exchange place and functions is another debated issue.

(6) METHODOLOGY

The last factor in the chain of interrelated frameworks concerns the issue of how (methodologically) to organize the study of changes over time – or even of how to collect and analyze a particular body of linguistic data from children.⁷ Textbooks reveal the advantages and disadvantages (usually in the form of 'expenses') of collecting diary data, of collecting longitudinal and/or cross-sectional samples, when and how to use the audio- and/or video-recorder, and so on. Decisions along these dimensions correlate heavily with choice of domain and research question (at what age do I want to get a 'slice' that is representative of what kind of processes).

It is at this level that the question of what constitutes 'good data' [after the previous five concerns have been sufficiently tuned with each other] can be more clearly formulated. As we have tried to document, good developmental data can only come to existence in light of considerations that relate the issue of

⁶ We do not wish to debate this orientation here, but would like to point out that the strong teleological framework gives way to the same criticism as the rationalist framework discussed above, namely that the whole or telos is informed and emerges by way of local changes.

⁷ The problem of how to study child language is similar to how to approach the language of aphasics or autism.

METHODOLOGY with the DOMAIN that is of interest, the TELOS that is formulated with regard to the COURSE of changes over time (in that particular domain); further, with the issue of what or who is organizing the developmental process in terms of the underlying ORGANISM or PERSON, and in a similar vein in terms of the MECHANISMS which keep this process going.

2. *The study of emotion talk*

In the following we will present a study of how children in 'real' life learn to speak about something which we believe does not exist, namely the existence of two simultaneously experienced emotions. However, whether we 'really' do 'have' emotions, and whether we can 'have' more than one at the same time is not relevant to what we are investigating, as long as people maintain that they can 'hold' two emotions at the same time, and as long as our subjects can give accounts that seem to match such incidents or occasions. Although English contains only few lexical items that seem to denote two simultaneously held emotions (e.g. 'nostalgia', and to some degree also 'melancholy'), the investigation of this 'domain' could nevertheless be characterized as part of the 'lexical domain', since it could be argued that two relatively firmly established lexical categories (e.g. happy and sad) are simply mixed.⁸

As such, our interest in this domain connects an earlier interest in the acquisition of the lexicon (Bamberg 1978, 1979, 1980) with our current interest in the development of different narrative genres. Thus, we will start with a brief summary of the semantics of (simple) emotion terms and the way developmental theorists have struggled with the issue of what is being acquired by the young child, before we turn to the issue of how narrative data [along a spectrum of different genres] can be used as 'good' data to illuminate the issue of how children learn to talk about emotions in general – and even possibly of what those objects are that are commonly called 'emotions'.

2.1 *The semantics of emotion terms*

Whatever 'emotions' 'really' are, in all languages do people use lexical items that can be summarized as 'emotion terms' – whether they exist as nouns, as verbs, as adjectives, or in the form of particles.⁹ Semanticists share the belief that there is a domain of human emotional experiences (which may

vary between cultures) that is differentiated by the classification system of the language spoken. "Every language imposes its own classification upon human emotional experience, and English words such as anger or sadness are cultural artifacts of the English language, not culture-free analytical tools" (Wierzbicka 1992:546). This need to decouple the cross-cultural study of emotion terms from the unexamined semantics of English emotion terms led semanticists like Wierzbicka to formulate a small set of universal semantic primitives that can identify emotion concepts in a culture-independent semantic meta-language. The primitives in terms of which emotion concepts can be "rigorously and revealingly portrayed" are 'good', 'bad', 'do', 'happen', 'know', and 'want' (Wierzbicka 1992:577).

Although this type of lexical analysis has been criticized as "narrowly lexical (and ultimately limited by the absence of contextual and performative information)" (White 1990:65), it nevertheless is interesting to see how the semantic primitives for emotion concepts represent 'script'-like ingredients without any characterization of actors or agents (though incorporating the values 'good' vs. 'bad' attributed by the actors). This should not come as a surprise, since the primitives were pulled and abstracted out of numerous narrative accounts of 'emotional experiences' across a large number of different languages. And the motivation for this approach was not to represent how the experiencer made sense of his/her experience, but rather how words are mapped into concepts and from there into prototypical event scenarios. As such, emotion terms can be argued to "reveal a 'concept' or 'category', and they exemplify the correct usage of the word that names that 'concept' or 'category', thereby telling us something about the native theory of the word's contextual appropriateness in instances of reference" (Rosenberg 1990:170).¹⁰

Turning further below to the analysis of narrative accounts of two simultaneously held emotions we hope to be able to re-address the language-concept-scenario issue by a closer attention to the local forms used in the narrative accounts. While lexical glossings of emotion experiences are revealing of motivational forces for situations, the grammar that 'surrounds' these glossings may be more so revealing of the way the self constructs such experiences and last but not least in this process constructs his or her own 'self'.

⁸ "It's only mixed emotions" - to quote Mick Jagger.

⁹ We are purposely vague in order to avoid taking a stance with regard to the debate whether emotions are the 'feelings' associated with physiological states 'caused' by external events (the so-called James-Lange view that was based on Descartes) or emotions are 'about' other objects or events (a position held by Aristotle and subsequently Brentano).

¹⁰ Rosenberg criticizes this approach as reducing "situated discourse to discourse about situations, and discourse about situations to word reference only. Interested human interaction appears as one of the mapped realities. Instead of exemplifying contextualized language use, investigators take word reference to be what language can be used for" (Rosenberg 1990:171).

2.2 *How children learn to talk about emotions (and other 'internal states')*

Developmental research on how children learn to communicate their own or third-person others' emotions by use of language usually starts out with the non- or pre-linguistic expression of affect in early infancy. Between 18 and 36 months children increasingly use emotion words to refer to their own and also to others' feeling states in descriptive situations but also to guide and influence others' behavior (Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Wexler & Ridgeway 1986). Huttenlocher & Smiley (1990) report that emotion words in reference to the self emerge in the observed children at the same time as names and pronouns, and intentional action references, and that person predicates applying to others also appear at the same time, though after the self is referentially 'established'. Perner (1991) uses empathy reactions that emerge around 30 months of age as evidence that young children at this age are able to use their understanding of their own 'inner emotional experience' as a theoretical construct for other persons' distress. The understanding of emotions' 'aboutness' is argued to develop between 5 and 6 years.

In sum, in developmental research it is usually assumed that an understanding of emotions is largely language independent. The ability to express and communicate emotion concepts in language is acquired at some later development, and there it helps to fulfill a regulative and clarifying function in interpersonal relationships. In these later developments the influence of language on how to conceptualize and possibly even on how to 'feel' is gaining momentum. The above cited studies by Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Wexler & Ridgeway (1986) and Huttenlocher & Smiley (1990) are reflecting this basic stance on the relationship between emotion, its conceptualization, and the way they are linguistically expressed, though at the same time these studies are some of the very few trying to view the emergence of emotion categories in the larger context of how notions of the person (the 'self') emerge and how these notions are tied into the conduct of interpersonal interactions. In general, at the time children begin to reason about how and why they feel the way they feel, how others feel and whether they should or should not feel that way – in other words, at the time when children begin to use narrative reasoning about self and other, developmental theories usually assume the understanding of emotions, desires, and of what is 'good' and 'bad' as formed.

In what follows we will try to delineate the domain of developmental inquiry into children's emotion talk somewhat differently. The domain will be identified as 'emotion discourse', i.e., as discourse on the topic of (a number of) emotions – emotions in its generality (do people 'have' emotions?), emotions in others, and emotions in one's own past history (experienced by the

self). The domain therefore can be specified as 'reasoning discourse' about emotions: how they come to existence and what they mean. Thus, the developmental issue has been shifted from the interrelationship between the existence of emotions, their conceptualizations, and their linguistic expressions, to how children learn to 'perspectivize' emotions. As such, our investigation will focus on the one hand, how different emotions require different forms of reasoning, and on the other, whether these forms of reasoning take shape differently when perspectivized from the self (as experiencer), from the perspective of a (concrete) third-person other, or from the standpoint of a generalized (abstract) other.

2.3 *The establishment of a 'vantage point' in narrative reasoning*

In order to be told, a narrative must have something like a vantage point – i.e., an overall point of view from which its parts are organized. This vantage point is closely related to the 'story point' (cf. Wilensky 1982a, 1982b) and also to what has been termed a story's 'tellability' or 'reportability' (cf. Jefferson 1978; Sacks 1970/71). However, the overall, organizational point of view from which a story is told is not anything that exists previous to the story in the narrator's mind, and then, subsequently, is executed in the course of the narrative. Rather, this vantage point unfolds over the course of narrating, as a product of carefully monitoring the reader's/listener's perspective, and grounding the information, so that what is considered relevant (to the story, for its tellability, and thus for the – present or imagined – audience) can stand out. In terms of its material production, the monitoring process is orchestrated discursively in narrators' skillful choice of linguistic devices to mark the (evaluative) perspectives on the various states, events, and episodes of the narrative.

One more general way of differentiating the perspectives from which the story information can be orchestrated is in terms of a speaker's 'involvement'. Involvement here first of all refers to the construction of the relationship between the narrator and his or her audience (cf. Chafe 1982; Tannen 1985, 1989). The choice of the present tense, and the choice of the (in English) first person-singular pronoun *I* – indexing the narrator as addressing him-/herself in service of the construction of an 'interior monologue' – present a more involved perspective: Audience and self are blended into a diffuse unit which are only separable if the narrator tries to explain or reveal him-/herself, i.e., giving possible reasons for why he/she takes a particular perspective on events, states, or episodes. These 'reasons' typically are revealed by giving insights into so-called inner states (thoughts or feelings) of the actants.

Letters, diaries and autobiographies follow this monologue quality, though they appear to address a person different from the self. Anonymous narrations, including the biography, on the other hand, all are third-person narratives, typically taking the past-tense as the temporal perspective to present events. These kinds of stories are themselves assembled along a continuum starting with the author (and reader) adopting a single character's point of view, followed by two or three characters' points of view, and finally disintegrating in the reflection of everybody's – i.e., ultimately nobody's – point of view. Moffett and McElheny characterize this latter perspective the following way: "By staying outside the minds of all his characters, a narrator reduces his roles as informer to eyewitness and chorus alone. He chooses not to present inner life at all, at least not directly" (Moffett & McElheny 1966:521).

In summary, the notion of 'involvement' reveals two different aspects of involvement which, however, seem to blend into each other: On the one hand, there is a direct involvement between narrator and audience; on the other, there is an involvement between narrator and audience which is mediated through the perspective on the characters and their actions (with information about the characters' inner states as the 'glue' that holds their actions together). At the more involved end of the 'involvement-detachment continuum' we can identify more clearly the establishment of a relationship between narrator and audience, while this relationship seems to be more constructed (i.e., it seems to be more 'objectified') when moving closer towards the less-involved (or: more-detached) end of the continuum. However, it should be kept in mind that the material condition through which the vantage point (resulting in a stance on the involvement – detachment continuum) emerges is the linguistic devices presented in the text.

One aspect of the representative linguistic choice has already been mentioned, namely the choice between different personal pronouns (English: *I* vs. *you* vs. *he/she* vs. *we* vs. *they* vs. *one*). Each of these linguistic forms indexes potentially a different perspective and as such a different level or degree of involvement. Another way of indexing involvement is the choice of the temporal/aspectual perspective which can either be lexicalized or it can be grammatically expressed. The choice of the present tense marker vs. the past tense vs. the conditional marker is a clear example of this choice. The interplay of aspect and Aktionsart (i.e., the choice of verbal expression) may best be demonstrated by use of the following two examples from our data. When asked to give a report of two simultaneously experienced emotions, a narrator gave these two scenarios:

- (1) SAD/ANGRY
I was sad that someone I love is leaving and I am angry that he left
- (2) HAPPY/SAD
I am happy that I am going to college but sad that I am leaving my friends and family

Apart from the fact that the narrator in example (1) signals a different temporal perspective on the two emotions [*sad* = past; *angry* = present], the aspectual unboundedness of *leaving* is contrasted with the aspectual boundedness of *left*. The same event is viewed from two different perspectives: the leaving of someone, and the having left. The two vantage points can consequently result in the (one?) 'experience' of two simultaneously felt emotions, sadness and anger.

Example (2) presents the same two perspectives on a similar 'leaving event', here the transition from highschool to college. In this example, two different (lexical) verbs have been chosen by the narrator in order to present the difference in perspective, *going* vs. *leaving*. While both verbs are motion verbs, sharing most of their semantic properties, *leaving* focuses on the source, keeping the telos unspecified; however, *going* keeps the source unspecified and focuses on the telos (endpoint) of the motion. Not only does the choice of the two verbs signal a different perspective along the temporal orientation [*leaving* = backwards; *going* = forward], but at the same time, the telic orientation of the action of moving towards something versus the atelic (and therefore: less agentive) orientation of moving away from something results in the simultaneous experience of a conflict – linguistically indexed by the choice of *but* in example (2), contrasting with a seemingly cumulative perspective of the two orientations in example (1).¹¹

¹¹ Compare in contrast the following example from a ten year old child for the ANGRY/SAD constellation:

- Child: Well, my grandfather died.
Interviewer: How did you feel sad and angry?
Child: Cuz I was sad he **was dead** and I was angry that he **died**.

As with example (1), the interviewee contrasted a state description ('being dead') with the result of a process ('dying'). The aspectual boundedness implied with the use of the simple past *died*, however, contributed to an implicit upgrade in agentivity of the subject of *died*. Compare the constructed examples:

- I was sad that he was dead (state)
I was sad that he was dying (process)
I was sad that he died (action)

In addition, a third level of analyzing the linguistic choices that ultimately contribute to the establishment of the vantage point and as such are indexing the degree of involvement focuses on how topic-comment foci are maintained and/or are shifted through the establishment of texts. We have documented elsewhere (Bamberg 1987, 1990, 1991a, 1991b; Bamberg & Budwig 1992; Bamberg & Marchman 1991) how linguistic choices result in text-building strategies and contribute to the pragmatics of the speaker/ audience relationship, and will not follow up this method of linguistic analysis here in more detail.

In sum, the orchestration of the vantage point is a result of a textual ('weaving') process of binding and unfolding (cf. Bamberg 1991a, 1992, 1994; Bamberg & Marchman 1990, 1991) in which the narrator establishes a relationship between him-/herself and the audience by viewing 'events' from a particular perspective and integrating these perspectivized events sequentially into a meaningful whole. Thus, the narrative whole is being held together through an intricate interweaving of what superficially looks like two different orientations (one towards the interactive partner, the other towards the [contents of the] text), which however are held together from an overarching involvement orientation, (a) the inner links and motivations of the actants in the story (prot- and antagonists), and (b) the outer links and motivations between narrator and audience through the story (see also Bamberg & Reilly 1994). Both levels of involvement are interconnected and point towards each other by way of linguistic composition.

With our research project, we start from the assumption that the analysis of how story conflicts are linguistically presented can reveal how an overall vantage point is constructed in service of what we have termed in the above the indexing of 'involvement'. Most typically, a story conflict comes to existence when a protagonist – or more generally: any potential agent – is facing ambiguity. This happens usually in a situation where new information cannot immediately or effortlessly be integrated into previously existing forms of

and

- ?I was angry that he was dead (state)
- ?I was angry that he was dying (process)
- I was angry that he died (action)

What the choice of the simple past of the verb *die* (or *leave* in example 1) indexed in these examples, seems to go along with the requirement of 'anger', namely to signal that the cause of anger was not an undifferentiated state or happening (just 'being there' or 'just happening'), but introduced – against the beliefs of the experiencer of what should have happened – by a willful, and responsible agent. The implication is that this willful agent should have shared the beliefs of the experiencer, could have avoided the incident from happening, and as such will be held responsible for his/her 'action'.

information (also called 'schemata' or 'scripts').¹² In this case, it is argued, that the agent is confronted with a choice between (at least two) action orientations. He/she has to make a decision which in turn is believed to result in the corresponding action(s).

Previous analyses of the role of references to emotions in narratives (Bamberg 1991a; Bamberg & Damrad-Frye 1991; Bamberg & Reilly 1994) have led us to assume that the prototypical story conflict centers around two conflicting interpretations/evaluations of what seemingly is the same information. For this reason, depictions of six conflict situations pieced together out of four basic emotive motivation orientations were formulated. In other words, taking the four (so-called 'basic') emotions 'anger', 'fear', 'happiness', and 'sadness', we assumed that usually different events lead up to the experiences of the situations called 'emotions', which in turn result in different action orientations. Then, we simply pitted these emotion events against each other, resulting in six emotion constellations: (A) AFRAID/ANGRY, (B) HAPPY/AFRAID, (C) HAPPY/ANGRY, (D) HAPPY/SAD, (E) SAD/ANGRY, and (F) SAD/AFRAID.

In order to be able to focus more closely on the problem of vantage point, and particularly how a vantage point becomes established in the process of narrative development in children, we designed an interview with three different foci: (1) on the general possibility of 'having' two different emotions at the same time; (2) on information that is leading up to or resulting in the experience of two emotions at the same time; and (3) on information that results from the experience of two simultaneous emotions. For focus (1) we asked the question: "Do you think it is possible to be xxx (e.g. *happy*) and yyy (e.g. *sad*) at the same time?"; for focus (2) we asked: "Can you tell us about a time when you felt xxx and yyy at the same time?"; and for focus (3) we asked our subjects to complete a scenario that we presented as leading up to the high-point, resulting in the experience of two of the emotions under scrutiny at the same time (see Appendix 1 for an illustration of these scenarios). It should be noted that focus (1) requires the least involvement (or the most detachment), since it seems to be almost completely detached from the narrator's own experience. Focus (2) requires the highest degree of involvement, since the narrator is asked to report his/her own experience – also often called 'personal narrative'; while focus (3) ranks somewhat in the middle: the narrator is asked to take on a third-person's perspective, and to follow through with an action orientation that follows (in the narrator's opinion) from the vantage point from which the (emotional) conflict is depicted. In brief, the three foci of the

¹² Thus, the notion of 'plan-breaking', which is commonly believed to be an indicator of 'story-goodness' or its tellability, is just a specific case of ambiguity.

interview were geared toward three narrative vantage orientations: (1) the as-if-perspective, resulting in a linguistic marking of a generalized other plus modality; (2) the I-perspective in connection with the simple-past; and (3) the he/she-perspective in connection with the simple past or the present tense.

2.4 *Children's abilities to deal with conflicting emotions.*

Before launching the report of how the subjects of our interviews 'performed' in the three tasks, and also, how their performance differed according to the different 'emotion-constellations', it may be helpful to summarize the findings from other studies which – though with a different theoretical orientation – have investigated children's reports of two simultaneously experienced emotions, and the understanding that supposedly is governing their performance in the reports.

Most research reports on the understanding of 'double' or 'mixed emotions' start with the puzzling observation that children in early infancy are able to express their emotions behaviorally, and in a similar vein ambivalent feelings, though they are not able to recognize the existence of ambivalent emotions till much later. Harter and her colleagues (Harter 1983; Harter & Buddin 1987; Harter & Whitesell 1989) have established a five-stage developmental sequence for the changes in children's understanding of the simultaneity of emotions. To summarize, this sequence entails that children before the age of six years basically cannot conceive of two simultaneous emotions, neither in their succession, nor simultaneously. They explicitly deny the possibility of their simultaneous existence. Between the age of six and eight, children begin to describe two emotions as part of one situation, though only insofar as one emotion is clearly followed by another. Around eight years, children begin to describe simultaneous emotions, first those of the same valence. Finally, around the age of ten years, children begin to integrate feelings of opposite valence – first those which are brought to bear on different targets, between eleven and twelve those that are provoked by the same target. According to Harris "each of these stages in the recognition of mixed feelings involves a change in the child's conceptualization of the causal links between situations and emotion" (Harris 1989:118).

In sum, most of these studies are guided by the assumption that at the core of children's understanding of emotion concepts is the causal relationship between situations and particular emotions, and that children's levels of cognitive development influence their understanding of this relationship (Harter & Whitesell 1989:81). Harris' assumption of two originally separate systems in the child's mind, i.e., the initial appraisal system and the explanatory system, which over the course of development are gradually re-organized,

gives a more specific account of how linkages are formed, finally leading to "the recognition that two concurrent events or even a single situation with two components can arouse ambivalent feelings" (Harris 1989:124). Thus, these theories construct a developmental continuity between the experience of 'double emotions' – particularly those that are viewed to provoke an experience of conflict – and the recognition of what caused the conflict, and consequently, the appreciation of 'double', 'competing', 'blended' or 'mixed emotions'.

Stein & Trabasso (1989) have taken issue with the way ambivalence is conceptualized in these theories. They draw a clear line between the recognition of the knowledge of what can make someone feel good or bad, and the actual feeling 'good' or 'bad', and call into question whether anyone actually can feel 'good' and 'bad' at the same time. If these evaluations are reported as if they refer to a mixed feeling state, this – according to Stein and Trabasso – should be traced to a more integrated knowledge representation (Stein & Trabasso 1989:74), but not necessarily to the recognition of a separate feeling state. Thus, while Stein and Trabasso restrict their approach to the development of emotion knowledge, i.e., knowledge about the causal structure of different emotional reactions, Harris and Harter seem to view knowledge about the situation-emotion relationship grounded in previous experiences in the self – from where this (interpretive) knowledge subsequently can be transposed (by way of the "process of imaginative construction" (Harris 1989:103)) onto others.

With our present study, we want to stay clear of the debate about whether emotion knowledge is a separate domain of cognitive development, or whether it is grounded in self-experience before it can be abstracted out of this experience into a form of knowledge, from where it subsequently can be applied to 'understand' emotions of self and of others. Our focus will be on the discourse conventions in which emotion talk is embedded, and as such, the 'concept' of emotions – as will be shown in our study of talk about the occurrence of two simultaneous emotions across genres – is an intrinsic part of communicative development in children. In contrast to deriving communicative competence out of an originally independent self-concept, we view SELF and OTHER as developmentally interlocked, and constituted by the same discourse practices as 'emotions' and 'conflict'.

3. 'Double emotions' and how children learn to talk about them

3.1 Methods and coding

3.1.1 *Subjects* For the interviews we recruited 48 (native English speaking) children from an elementary school in one of the major cities of New England, USA, as well as 20 undergraduate students from a small New England University. The children ranged between 5;5 and 12;0 years of age, and were divided into three different age groups: the younger age group (mean age 6;3; range 5;5-7;3; n=17), the middle age group (mean age 8;6; range 7;10-9;7; n=15), and the older age group (mean age 10;7; range 9;11-12;0; n=14). The responses of two children were not included in the data set, since the children seemed unresponsive to any of the interview questions. The adults ranged between 18 and 22 years.

3.1.2 *Interview* The interview consisted of three parts.

(1) Story Completion Task: In this section of the interview, six brief story complications (conflicts) were presented to the subjects, each resulting in a simultaneous experience of two emotions ('happy', 'afraid', 'angry', and 'sad'). At the high-point of each story, the interviewer explicitly stated the two emotions including the reasons for the two emotions (see Appendix 1 for examples of the interview scenarios), and then asked the subject to continue the story.

(2) Possibility Question: The interviewees were asked the question: "Do you think it is possible to be xxx (e.g. *happy*) and yyy (e.g. *sad*) at the same time?"

(3) Report Question: This part of the interview usually followed the Possibility Question. In 50% of the cases the interviewees were asked to follow up on their positive answer to the Possibility Question by way of an example ('Possibility Question Elaboration'). In the other 50% the subjects were explicitly asked to report an incident of a simultaneously experienced double-emotion from their own experience ("Can you tell me about a time when you felt both xxx (e.g. *angry*) and yyy (e.g. *afraid*) at the same time?") ('Personal Report Question'). The interview schedule followed step (1) through to step (3). The procedure was repeated for each of the six emotion constellations which were arranged in a randomized order for each subject. All responses were tape recorded, transcribed, and coded.

3.1.3 *Coding* The coding for the subjects' responses to the Personal Report Question, the Possibility Question Elaboration, i.e., all narratives that

were expected to be told from the perspective of the narrating self, as well as the Story Completions (expected to be given from the third person perspective) proceeded along four possible dimensions: (a) self as experiencer; (b) hypothetical self as experiencer; (c) other as experiencer; and (d) hypothetical other as experiencer. The coding along these dimensions was straight forward, since the use of personal pronouns along with the tense forms indexed clearly the narrating perspective: (a) *I* plus past tense (including occasional switches to the historical present); (b) *I* plus verbal modality markers (including adverbial modality devices such as *probably*, *maybe*, and the like); (c) concrete third persons plus past tense, or a generalized third person (*one*, *someone*, *you*) plus present tense; (d) the generalized third person plus verbal (incl. adverbial) modality marking. The following examples from the adult corpus illustrate the four coding categories.

(3) HAPPY/SAD [self as experiencer]

When I was a junior in high school I got expelled from school. I then went to boarding school and I loved it. I partied all the time and I was a really popular kid in the school. Everyone loved me and I loved everyone. But my grades were bad ... three F's ... I got expelled for that particular incident. And uhm I was sad that I got kicked out of school but I was happy because I know that if I stayed there I would end up going to community college and probably work at Burger King or something.

(4) SAD/AFRAID [hypothetical self as experiencer]

Well when I was .. I can remember uhm on maybe a couple of occasions when I was young my parents would fight you know yell a lot at each other and I would be afraid because they were fighting and you know fighting's always kind of a fearful thing but I was also sad because they were not getting along.

(5) ANGRY/HAPPY [(concrete) other as experiencer]

Well I was not driving my car. And when we got into the accident this ... guy whose car I was driving was very angry cause we got into an accident but at the same time he was happy because no one was hurt.

- (6) HAPPY/SAD [(generalized) other as experiencer]
Let me think ... I can't think right off the bat ... I think like an accident or something .. or they are happy that they are alive but very sad that maybe someone died.
- (7) SAD/ANGRY [hypothetical other as experiencer]
Uhm I guess if someone dies you'd feel angry that the person died and at the same time you could be sad because you will not see that person again.

In addition, the responses to the Personal Report Question and the Possibility Question Elaboration were coded along two genre dimensions. The first is a scenario-type of narrative. Examples (1) and (2) above stand as exemplars of this genre type. They typically do not consist of eventive (i.e., action oriented) information but rather of a situation or setting description (states or agentless processes) such as 'being in a car accident', 'leaving home for college', 'experiencing a loss', and the like. In contrast, an event sequence consists of at least one antecedent event, the emotion states, and sometimes some form of subsequent happening (a re-action or a change in feeling state) that followed the emotion(s). Example (3) above illustrates this kind of narrative option in as far as a number of events in their sequential accumulation are built up to the experience of two simultaneous emotions (though we can see here also that the 'second' emotion may come from 'hindsight', i.e., from some later recognition that 'after all' it turned out for the better). Reliability ratings for the scenario/event sequence differentiation, performed by two judges on a subset of 81 reports measured 82%. Full agreement could be reached when the two judges discussed the remaining cases individually.

Coding for responses to the Possibility Question did not pose any difficulty, since there were either 'yes' or 'no' answers to this question. A few "I am not sure" or "I don't know" answers were added to a third category, i.e., those responses that had given a 'yes' answer to the Possibility Question, but were not able to follow up with a report.

3.2 Results

3.2.1 *Is it possible to have two emotions at the same time?* When asked whether it is possible to be xxx and yyy at the same time, we find 60% of the younger age group (mean age 6:3 years) respond positively, though 29% of

these responses were not followed up with a report.¹³ With increasing age, more children responded positively to the question, though it should be stressed that even in the adult group (20 year old students) almost 8% rejected the possibility of having these two emotions at the same time.

Turning briefly to a consideration of whether there is a difference in responses to the different emotion constellations, we found that the following emotion constellations were more likely to be rejected (or not responded to by a report): (B) HAPPY/AFRAID, (C) HAPPY/ANGRY, and (F) SAD/AFRAID. While the former two [(B) and (C)] are of different valence, the latter is not. Emotion constellations (A) AFRAID/ANGRY, (E) ANGRY/SAD, and (D) HAPPY/SAD

	"No"	"Yes"	Indicating problems but unable to report	⇒	in acceptance
Young Age Group (mean age 6:3 yrs)		40%	29%	⇒	58%
Middle Age Group (mean age 8:6 yrs)		32%	18%	⇒	44%
Older Age Group (mean age 10:7 yrs)		21%	18%	⇒	36%
Young Adults (mean age 20 yrs)		5%	15%	⇒	17%

Table 1: Responses to the Question "Is it possible to have two emotions at the same time?"

seemed to present much less of a problem for the children. However, with age – in particular with their development to adulthood, there is a clear shift in emotion constellations which are rated as more rejectable: While the different valences do not seem to present a problem any longer, constellation (A) AFRAID/ANGRY now seems to pose more of an unresolvable conflict, resulting in a much higher rate of negative responses to the Possibility Question (as well as struggles in coming to grips with an adequate self-report). One adult's reasoning of why it is not possible to feel 'afraid' and 'angry' at the same time illustrates the kind of responses we received from a number of the adult

¹³ The typical answer to our follow-up request was: "I can't think of any such situation right now".

interviewees:¹⁴

(8) ANGRY/AFRAID

Because I think that .. uhm .. those are two ... if they were exactly polar like HAPPY and SAD then it is possible ... but these [ANGRY and AFRAID] are so far apart that they are unrelated whereas opposites are related. Those are so unrelated that I don't see there being a correlation. When you are angry fear usually goes by the way-side. One of these feelings will be dominant over the other one ... it consumes the other.

In sum, it appears from this first analysis of the responses to the Possibility Question, as if children in their ability of dealing with story conflicts of the kind under investigation have more difficulties with the different valence emotions HAPPY/AFRAID and HAPPY/ANGRY, while (somewhat surprisingly) HAPPY/SAD does not seem to present such a problem. Counter to our intuitions, the emotion constellation AFRAID/ANGRY, which did not seem to present a problem in terms of its acceptability early on, becomes more and more of a problem in terms of being acceptable with increasing development.

In spite of these developmental changes, it should be noted that the responses to the question posed, at all age ranges show some sort of hesitation, which seems to reflect an ambivalence on the respondents' part between 'yes – but also ('at the same time'?) no'. And the younger the children, the doubts and clear 'no'-responses seem to be more salient; however, the same (or different?) hesitations and ambivalence seems to be still existent in the adult subjects (though no longer as prevalent as at an early age). Turning next to the analyses of how subjects responded to the two other questions they were asked in the course of the interview, we will examine how the ability to discursively resolve conflicting emotions emerges and at the same time why subjects may hesitate in accepting the possibility of two simultaneous emotions.

¹⁴ It should be noted that this finding runs counter to our folk-belief, which holds that opposite valence emotions are more difficult to encounter simultaneously. Adults' reasoning seems to rely heavily on this folk belief. When asked whether it is possible to be sad and angry at the same time, one of our adult interviewees answered: "Yeah, because they are both negative, so it's extremely easy to feel them together". However, when it came to reason about the possibility of having two emotions of different valence at the same time, the same subject seemed to feel somewhat trapped in her own reasoning strategy, and stated: "Well, they are sort of opposite emotions. It is possible in any situation that there can be two emotions present. There is no rule that says there just has to be one in each situation. A situation can bring about two emotions even if they're opposite".

3.2.2 *Can you tell me about a time when you felt emotion x and emotion y at the same time?* The category of 'self-reports' consisted of basically two kinds of responses; one to the interview question: "Can you tell me about a time when you felt both {emotion x} and {emotion y} at the same time?", the other to the request to elaborate by way of a personal example, if the interviewee had responded positively to the Possibility Question (cf. section 3.2.1). The first question type was named 'Report Question', the second 'Possibility Elaboration (Question)'.

When the two response types were coded in terms of the two coding devices described in the coding section above (code 1: 'scenario' vs. 'event sequence'; code 2: 'self experiencer' vs. 'hypothetical other'), the following differences in responses emerged:

<i>Emotion Constellation</i>	<i>With increase in age (from 5- 20 years)</i>
(B) HAPPY/AFRAID	} From less acceptable → acceptable
(C) HAPPY/ANGRY	
(F) SAD/AFRAID	
(A) AFRAID/ANGRY	} From more acceptable → less acceptable

Table 2: *Developmental trends in acceptability of particular emotion constellations.*

(a) The Report Question was typically responded to in a narrative format, i.e., by a sequence of events as well as in an involved narrator stance (first person, past tense). However, though the involved stance remains the same across the different age groups, there is a trend with increasing age to respond to the Report Question by way of shortening the events and pointing out the conflict in a scenario fashion as presented in examples (1) and (2) above.¹⁵

(b) The responses to the Possibility Elaboration Question presented a different picture. First, it should be noted that quite a number of children as well as adults responded by way of presenting an event sequence just as they might have done in response to the Report Question. While children of the

¹⁵ An example for an 'event sequence' presentation is given in example (3) above.

youngest age group (mean age 6:3 years) do not have a clear preference for either response, with increasing age they opt favorably for a more scenario-like response, i.e., they cut down on the event sequences and focus increasingly on the conflict. Note that we also observed this trend in response to the Report Question; here, however, this trend is much stronger, resulting in a very clear preference for a scenario-type presentation of the conflict in early adulthood.

Second, in contrast to the responses to the Report Question, where the involved stance was the predominant discursive response for all age groups, children before the age of ten years seem not to have developed a clear stance on the involvement-detachment continuum. Though around 90% of the children in our sample opted for a choice on either end of the continuum (self experiencer vs. hypothetical other – only 10% used either the ‘concrete other as experiencer’ or the ‘hypothetical self’), starting around ten years of age, children opt more clearly for the detached narrative stance, reporting the conflict from the perspective of a hypothetical other, as for instance in the following example given from a child 10:5 years old:

(9) HAPPY/SAD

Like you can be real sad about something went away or your friend moved and stuff and then you could be happy because uhm the person could make like new friends and you could still probably write to them and stuff like that.

Thus, taking the responses to the two different kinds of interview questions together, we can diagnose a tendency with increasing age to remove the narrating perspective from the linearization of events to a more pointed and more decisive perspective on the conflict itself. This process of centering may possibly best be described as a move away from the early focus on one extended (or two different) event sequence(s) [leading up to the conflict between two simultaneously ‘experienced’ emotions – which nevertheless were kept apart from each other] towards a focus on the conflict *per se*; detaching the conflict somewhat from its precipitating events. The second shift, i.e., the developmental shift to view the conflictual aspects from the perspective of the hypothetical other, presents a more central shift in the narrator’s ability to change perspective according to his/her involvement (vs. detachment). In terms of viewing the conflict between two emotions (including their motivational bases and different motivational orientations) from a vantage point of an imagined, less-involved, detached third-person perspective, the conflict itself may take on a different meaning in terms of what it is all about – including the motivations of those involved (self and/or others) and possible

different options of resolving the conflict. Actually, it may very well be that the ability to cut out the more eventive, sequential information (i.e., to focus on the conflict *per se*), and the ability to present it from a detached, third-person perspective, may go hand in hand and influence each other developmentally.

Turning to a more refined analysis of children’s performance regarding the particular emotion constellations, two of the ambivalence constellations stick out, (D) HAPPY/SAD, and (B) HAPPY/AFRAID: Constellation (D) is treated neutrally in both elicitation conditions, i.e., both when asked to elaborate on the Possibility Question or to respond with a Report, subjects responded with as many ‘scenarios’ as with (more elaborate) ‘event sequences’. For constellation (B) HAPPY/AFRAID, we found the same neutral split in the Report condition, while the Possibility Elaboration condition surprisingly elicited more narratives than scenarios. Note that our predictions (as well as the actual outcome) for all other constellations were ‘event sequences’ in response to the Report Question, and ‘scenarios’ in response to the Possibility Question. The fact that two of the three ambivalence constellations (i.e., constellations with one ‘positive’ and one ‘negative’ emotion) were responded to in terms of a break

	PERSONAL NARRATIVES				POSSIBILITY QUESTION ELABORATIONS			
	Young Age Group	Middle Age Group	Older Age Group	Adults	Young Age Group	Middle Age Group	Older Age Group	Adults
Self as Experiencer	93%	94%	87%	94%	42%	44%	17%	72%
Hypothetical Self as Experiencer	6%	4%	2%	3%	5%	4%		6%
Concrete or Generalized Other as Experiencer			5%		5%	7%	2%	4%
Hypothetical Other as Experiencer		2%	5%	3%	48%	44%	81%	8%
Event Sequence	68%	65%	54%	33%	50%	37%	33%	15%
Scenario	32%	35%	46%	67%	50%	63%	67%	85%

Table 3: Responses along the two genre dimensions: (a) Self vs. hypothetical other as experiencer & (b) scenario vs. event sequence.

from the (expected) pattern – in line with the above reported findings regarding early rejections of the ambivalent constellations (B) HAPPY/AFRAID and (C) HAPPY/ANGRY – may be interpreted as a general uneasiness of younger children in coming to terms with two opposing valences in story conflicts, while the same valence (which in our study means two negative emotions) does not seem to pose the same problem.

It also should be noted that the tendency in children – especially in the younger age groups – to respond by use of event sequences, often resulted in the report of two event sequences that led up to two simultaneously ‘felt’ emotions, such as in the following report by a five-year old child for constellation (B) HAPPY/AFRAID:

(10) HAPPY/AFRAID

I was like happy when I was going on this ride
it was called the Kiddie Mobile
it was awesome
there was these like dogs chasing around ...
(...)
and I was scared cause I put my finger out
to see if he could bite it ...
and I looked in his eyes
and there was no eyes
but they were fake

As this example documents nicely, one emotion is viewed as resulting from the event of ‘going on a ride’, which then is ‘replaced’ by a new event chain that is viewed as resulting in the other – in this case: opposite valence – emotion. The overall report takes on the configuration of a well-formed sequence of two separate event chains, where the first one provides the ‘setting’ or grounding for the second one, and the second in turn takes on somewhat of the ‘complication’ of the overall report. In sum, the configuration as a whole takes on some sort of ‘story-appeal’. When this sort of sequencing of two event chains is contrasted with the typical scenario report, the way they are provided by older children, the difference in perspective or what we had called ‘vantage point’ may become clearer:

(11) AFRAID/HAPPY

I was afraid that I wasn’t gonna do good on my spelling test
but I know, even if I didn’t get a bad mark,
I was happy that I tried my best

As a last point we would like to stress the developmental shift that seems to take place between childhood and young adulthood: While the overall trend to report in the form of scenarios (as opposed to event sequences) continues into adulthood, the trend to report from a more detached perspective, i.e., from the perspective of a ‘hypothetical other’, is reversed: Young adults seemingly return to what younger children (in our study) started out with, namely to report from the perspective of the self as the primary experiencer. The following section will focus particularly on the issue of perspective taking and the notion of involvement in narratives on the same theme, i.e., conflicting emotions – though shifting to take issue with the imagined emotions (including their conflict) in others.¹⁶

3.2.3 How children learn to take perspective on what happens when others have two simultaneously conflicting emotions With this section we will turn to the results from the story-continuation part of the interview study. It should be recalled that continuing a story from a point when the conflict between two simultaneous emotions was made explicit presents a task to the interviewee different from the ‘self report’ in two respects: (a) the continuation is expected to follow a more detached mode of narrating (third person + past tense vs. first person, past tense in ‘self-reports’); (b) the continuation focuses on behaviors or actions following the emotion conflict (while the ‘self report’ focused on the situation previous, and as such leading up to the emotion conflict). Keeping these two different orientation points in mind, we will focus in the following more closely on the developmental changes in the children’s narrative abilities regarding their viewpoint taking. Of particular interest will be the question whether children go through a similar process of detachment as in their ‘self reports’, and if so, when does this detachment process take place. Considering that the general narrative stance that is under investigation in this (third person + past tense) genre is a less involved one when compared with the ‘self report’, a comparison between the two different genres will provide more insights regarding the functions of the detachment process for narrative performance and narrative understanding. Furthermore, we will confine ourselves in this section to reporting just the findings regarding children’s (and adults’) narrative stance, i.e., their choice of linguistic devices such as pronoun choice and tense marking.

While all children of all three age groups as well as our adult interviewees continue the given story conflicts within an overall third person perspective (cf.

¹⁶ The folk-belief that emotions (including conflicts between emotions) are ‘imagined’ when occurring in others, while being ‘felt’ when occurring in the self will be more explicitly challenged in our concluding section.

example 12 below from an adult story continuation), the simple past – though the predominant tense marker for all age groups – is not always chosen.

- (12) AFRAID/ANGRY (Harry Hare didn't let Chippy Chipmunk have his turn – resulting in the above emotion constellation) O.k. they had a big argument and fought for a while but the in uhm hare uhm Harry finally won out uhm. Chippy was not going to put up with this and he let it be known throughout the completion of their relationship ... he made it clear to him that he wasn't going to forget this but let him ride in front. So their relationship was tinted uhm harmed.

While only 6% of the story continuations given by the youngest age group deviated from the past tense, almost one quarter (= 23%) of the middle age group opted for this choice. The following example taken from an eight-year-old child illustrates the kind of tense choice typical for those narratives not told in the simple past tense:

- (13) AFRAID/ANGRY (cf. expl. 12)
 Question: So can you finish this one?
 Child: well uhm it was his turn to be in the front, and his turn to be in the back. They should have done it and cause they ... well if they could both sit in the front they both could have sat in the front
 Question: that's true. Do you think that's a good way to make the story end? .. no? .. ok .. so then what .. they both get in the front and then what?
 Child: uhm then there would be no problem .. unless there was not enough room. Then they could sit in the front and one sit in the back

The choice of the modality markers *could*, *should*, and *would* signals a different stance towards the reported events and their sequentiality. First of all, the epistemic stance towards the events and their sequentiality is one of a marked imagined reality. Comparing the examples from this age group that shared this particular epistemic stance led us to believe that the modality marking indexed the attempt of the children to go back into the actual conflict and try to work out a perspective from which the conflict could have taken a different shape – and consequently a different turn regarding its solution. The following example from a late nine-year old narrator illustrates particularly well how he

struggles with finding a solution to the conflict by going (mentally) through all possible options which could or should have been chosen by the two participants of the story in order to avoid the conflict.

- (14) ANGRY/HAPPY (Felix Fox had tickled Piggy Pig and thus caused both to fall off the bike on their way to Michael Mouse's birthday party – resulting in the above emotion constellation)
 Question: now can you finish the story?
 Child: uhm first of all uhm Mr. Felix shouldn't have tickled uhm Ms. Piggy Pig because uhm if he wanted to go fast he should have asked her and she might, she might say yes. But uhm he shouldn't have tickled her because uhm she can't go fast when YOU tickle her because uhm she's only uhm paying attention to what he's doing than to steering wheel and uhm SOMEBODY could have really gotten hurt when they fell off the bike and uhm they wouldn't be, they couldn't get to uhm Michael Mouse's birthday party in time and instead of uhm doing what uh Mr Felix Fox did, he shoulda just uhm kept on riding instead of just uhm tickling Piggy Pig

In short, rather than completing the task by accepting the conflict between the two emotions as given, a number of narratives of the middle age group (23%) suggested that the interviewees tried to think about options of how the conflict could have been avoided. To us, this did not a priori imply the same kind of detachment as the modality marking used in the 'self reports' of the older age group of children. Rather, the particular epistemic stance of the middle age group in the story completions seemed to reflect the first strides in coming to terms with conflicting emotions in third-person stories by imposing somewhat of an integrative perspective. Interestingly, this kind of use of modality marking by the middle-age group of children drops off in the older age group to almost 11%, and is not used at all for the same function any longer by young adults. Rather, when a modality form is employed in the adults' story continuations, it is integrated into past tensed propositions, indicating a reflected stepping back and forth between the events following the given (and accepted) conflict of emotions in the third person story protagonist, though narrated from an overall (omnipresent) vantage point that is clearly marked as imagined. The following example (taken from an adult interviewee) exemplifies this kind of modality marking serving a forward-orienting (in contrast to the middle age group of children) narrative function, that results in a resolution to the conflict:

- (15) HAPPY/SAD (a boy saved Freddy the Frog's life and wanted to take him home so he couldn't be with his friends (resulting in the above emotion constellation))

Question: Can you complete this story?

Adult: it seems like this frog is a sociable sort and he did have many friends on the pad and he will probably maximize his friendships with other animals in the house. I mean to have as many friends as he did YOU have to put up with a lot of shit from people. So he probably put up with the shit the boy gave him but still managed to be his friend and he will end up being happy.

In sum then, what the task to continue a story conflict of two simultaneously experienced emotions required from our adult subjects is some form of stepping back from what was given in the 'text line' and to 'imagine' a uniting perspective on what could happen next. This forward-oriented perspective that was implicitly asked for by the way we had designed this part of the narrative task, requires an integration of two different orientations: on the one hand, an orientation towards the establishment of events in their sequential order. This orientation provides the linear axis of order according to which events follow each other. In the story completion task that was used in this study, we have clear evidence that five year old children are able to create and sequence events along this axis. However, at that age children only rarely can 'resolve' the situation of the two conflicting emotions. Resolving the conflict requires the ability to step out of the linearity of unfolding events and to 'bind' them from another orientation point, namely an overarching, hierarchically organized vantage point from which two emotions with their conflicting action orientations can be tied together – leading to something like a resolution of the conflict. The resolution, and thus the development of this overarching perspective requires one to go back into the story situation, to reconsider what had happened (including the possible reasons and motivations of the characters) and to weigh this information with regard to its future action potential (e.g. does the narrator want to let the prot- and antagonists fight [expl. 12], be angry with each other for the rest of their lives [expl. 12], or be happy and friends again a minute later [expl. 15]?), and finally to come up with a discursive decision. The modality indexing used by the middle age group of children characterizes the beginnings of this reflective – and to some degree detached – orientation, though it also shows nicely how the children got stuck in this frame of looking back into the conflict and weighing possible perspectives – and as such seem to be very much involved in the conflict itself. They

have not yet developed the ability of hierarchically and linearly ordering and integrating the two perspectives into one. This ability seems to be clearly on its way in the older children, resulting in the forms adults respond to the story completion task as illustrated in the example above.

3.3 Discussion

The fact that adult native English speakers by one sixth (17%) express problems (or at least hesitations) in accepting the possibility of having two emotions at the same time is somewhat troublesome, since it denies us to establish a clear cut developmental telos for our study. However, the developmental trend from more than half of the youngest age group expressing their problems with accepting the possibility to 'only' one sixth in the group of young adults speaks for a clear shift in perspective on how to view the occurrence of two simultaneously experienced emotions. Without going deeper at this point into the bases for rejecting the possibility of double emotions, we can nevertheless on good grounds characterize the developmental shift in perspective as one from a more involved to a more detached vantage point. The basic reason for this assumption lies in subjects' different reasoning strategies for their non-acceptance as well as in the ways they elaborated on the Possibility Question if they had answered it positively.

Possibility Elaborations, as well as Personal Self Reports indicated a clear developmental trend toward a shortening of the event sequence leading to brief scenario presentations which stand in an exemplaric fashion for double emotion experiences. In none of these exemplars is there any attention paid to reporting the body sensations of the simultaneous feelings. Rather, it is the perspective of what could count as the presentation of the same situation from two different angles that is at the core of subjects' responses. Again, the ability to present these situations in a more scenario-like fashion demarcates a more detached, overarching perspective, expressed by use of linguistic devices that seem to fill in for (developmentally earlier) more elaborate event representations. The same developmental trend towards a scenario-like representation of the third-person story completion task points up that the detachment process runs somewhat parallel when different genres are compared.

However, our more concrete analysis of whose perspective is presented in the different reports and story completions revealed that the development of a more detached perspective on the conflicts presented does not develop in total synchrony. While the more involved genre of self-reports elicited a high number of detached as-if-perspectives in the responses of the older age group of children (mean age 10:7 years), the same kind of linguistic as-if-orientation surfaced in the less involved third-person story completions about two years

earlier.

However, it should be noted – as we already indicated in the result section above – that this particular use of a generalized detached modality perspective is not a continuous trend. Rather, the sudden spurts in both genres seem to stand for a separate phase in children's discursive development, at which they struggle with particular aspects of the recognition of the conflicts under investigation and their possible resolutions. Though the Self Reports and Story Completions focus on different aspects of the genesis of the conflict, the fact that children bring to bear the as-if-perspective in the third-person genre (Story Completions) before they use it in the first-person genre (Self Reports) may come as a surprise for those who hold that the first-person perspective is the more privileged, and that detachment proceeds from here to the (inferential – by analogic inferences) recognition of the third-person perspective. However, for those who see these reports and/or completions for what they are, i.e., for discursive constructions of 'real' happenings, our finding is in agreement with the expectation that the third-person perspective (that the narrator is supposed to take in the story completion task) actually facilitates the detachment process of bringing the as-if-(modal)-perspective to bear, and as such contributes to the development of a better, overarching vantage point to the conflict as a whole. In contrast, the more involved first-person perspective required by the Personal Self Report Question resists the as-if-(modality)-perspective somewhat, resulting in the developmental delay of about two years. It may even be argued, though at this point we can only speculate, that an early recognition of the function of the as-if perspective for the overall detachment process may spill over and set off the ability to incorporate the same perspective into originally more involved genres. This developmental orientation would impact heavily on what is commonly termed the 'discursive constitution of the self' and contrast sharply with the commonly held belief in Psychology of the isolated individual who either constructs the ability to detach out of him-/herself or 'learns' this ability by analogic reasoning from the self as the center to hypothetical others 'outside'. We will return to this debate in our concluding remarks.

Turning next to a discussion of the particularities of the conflicts under investigation, namely two simultaneously held emotions, we find our study in a number of ways in agreement with the findings reported by Harris and Harter, and their respective associates (cf. Harris 1985, 1989; Harris & Lipian 1989; Harter 1983; Harter & Buddin 1987; Harter & Whitesell 1989). In line with their reports, we found that the younger the children, the more they have difficulties in coming to terms with emotion constellations of different valence; though it should be added that the younger subjects in our study were reluctant in accepting simultaneous emotions of the same valence, too. Furthermore, we

also found some major restructuring processes in coming to terms with the conceptualization of two simultaneous emotions around the age of ten years. However, whereas Harris argued that the age by which simultaneous emotions are reconceptualized does not vary "whether children are asked to recall such situations from their own past, to invent appropriate situations or to analyze the feelings of a character of a story" (Harris 1989:115), our findings point toward a different interpretation.

First of all, it should be noted that our findings provide no grounds to maintain that the 'recognition of ambivalence' (cf. Harter & Whitesell 1989; Harris 1989:115) forms the developmental telos. In spite of the above stated developmental trend, which at first sight seemed to support Harter's and Harris' research orientation, the relatively high rate of subjects rejecting the possibility of two simultaneous emotions (even in our adult sample) led us to another interpretation. Rather than starting from the assumption that "a situation may contain two conflicting components" (Harris 1989:115) which the child needs to learn to appreciate by re-integrating these two components into the situation, we suggest to view the process as one of more clearly differentiating the components that make up 'a situation' – in particular one that is said to hold two emotions simultaneously.¹⁷ By taking the ability to accept the possibility of holding two emotions simultaneously out of the realm of a reality existing outside of the subject (being there in situations – just to be recognized), and bringing it back into the discursively constituted realm where it takes shape as the ability to impose a double vantage point on what is seemingly 'one' situation or just 'happening' (such as the experience of a loss, or going off to college), we are in a better position to explain why there are 5% of our adult subjects who straightforwardly reject the possibility of two simultaneous emotions, and another 12% who cannot elaborate this so called experience with a Self Report. Furthermore, it is not the issue of valence that poses problems in this ability to take perspective(s) but rather the notions of agency and actor involvement. The fact that particularly the emotion constellation (A) ANGRY/AFRAID caused problems for adult subjects leads us to suspect that the different action orientation (for 'anger' against the object that caused the emotion, for 'fear' away from the object that caused the emotion) may be held responsible for its high rejection rate.¹⁸ Similar factors seem to play a role in

¹⁷ The underlying assumption here is that the child before age ten is able to differentiate the two emotional components of what is assumed to be 'one' situation, but not to recognize them as one unit of 'mixed feeling'.

¹⁸ This interpretation throws a completely different light onto children's earlier problems with different valence constellations: While children early on seem to focus on the behavioral components of the eliciting or precipitating events, where the valence of the emotion

the higher likelihood to reply with a rejection to the following emotion constellations:

- Do you think it is possible to be slightly annoyed and extremely furious at the same time?
- Do you think it is possible to be really furious and totally elated at the same time?¹⁹
- Do you think it is possible to be happy and elated at the same time?

Thus, if the ability to ‘recognize’ and ‘appreciate’ two simultaneous emotions is conceived of as the ability to take two perspectives on what seemed to be one event or happening, we have formulated a different developmental telos, namely to develop a somewhat detached orientation from which the two perspectives can jointly be held. The above considerations regarding the developmental changes towards a more detached perspective between the age of eight and eleven years point clearly in this direction. It should, however, be noted that the development of a new form of detachment around that age is by no means a more reality-adequate position. Rather, the ability to differentiate two perspectives on what could be seen previously only from one vantage point, is grounded in the discursive constitution of linguistic means, and as such ultimately serves the purpose to be integrated into a new level of speaker-hearer ‘involvement’.

4. *Conclusions*

In the broadest sense, the present study has focused on developmental changes in the ability to take perspectives on ‘situations’. These changes were viewed as a function of the development of detachment, and as such are seen to contribute to the ability to construct conflicts – particularly those between different emotions.²⁰ Within this framework then, the ability to construct conflicts from a more detached, i.e., a more differentiating perspective is not only central to children’s narrative abilities but at the same time to their general discursive and cognitive functioning. In contrast to the misunderstanding of the development of detachment as the ability to develop decontextualized concepts

process is more salient, they shift within their development to take other parts of the emotion process into account, such as the events that **follow** an ‘emotion experience’.

¹⁹ Again, though it seems as if ‘intensity’ is the blocking factor, we would want to argue that agency and actor involvement are the relevant factors in blocking the possibility to view the two perspectives from a common vantage point.

²⁰ To make perfectly clear what this implies: It is not ‘emotions’ ‘who’ cause conflict(s), but the perspective(s) imposed for discursive purposes by persons who use language.

by an autonomous individual, we see the development of detachment as leading to higher levels of communicative involvement between speaker and hearer. Thus, the ability to construct and resolve conflicts, and in the same vein the understanding of emotions in self and in others are argued to be locked into the way the ‘I-WE balance’ is constructed in the discursive constitution of what is assumed to be the SELF (cf. Elias 1991).

Against this background let us address two possible misunderstandings. We do not claim that emotions (or along the same line of argument: conflicting emotions) are only imagined for discursive purposes and therefore not ‘real’. The ‘discursive constitutions of emotions’ implies that emotions have an existence – though not in the same sense as thunderstorms or rock formations. The fact that the English language does not categorically differentiate between phenomena that are constituted by discourse practices (such as beliefs, morals, emotions and selves) and those that are not (such as thunderstorms or rock formations), but rather treats them *uno sono* by way of nouns, does not imply that they are similar and can be analyzed along the same lines. By shifting the focus in our study on the ‘simultaneity’ of emotions, and avoiding the terms ‘mixed emotions’ or ‘double emotions’, we could not fully escape giving the impression that the phenomenon of emotions exists as an entity that can be investigated outside the person. Nevertheless, the ‘simultaneity’ aspect sufficiently foregrounded the course or process character of emotions (in contrast to the ‘feeling state’) to clarify the issue of perspective in language use as the most central aspect for the constitution of emotion(s).

Again, this is not to deny that there are bodily sensations or a ‘biological basis’ of emotionality. However, this aspect is peripheral to the (symbolic) process of communication and understanding of emotions. Viewing emotions foremost as embedded in the process of communication, we are forced to construct the process of understanding emotions not as being the product of an isolated (= uncommunicative) being who is only able to rely on his/her body (or: biology) as the ‘true’ cue for his/her/its interpretation. Rather, the understanding of emotions as symbolic processes, i.e., how others behave in situations that are assumed emotive, feeds into the understanding of what the self feels and how he/she behaves, i.e., into the making sense of one’s own experience – in the same way as how one’s own emotional experience may contribute to the understanding of emotional experiences of others.

This proposal of the communicative interlocking of experiencing (in the self) and understanding emotions (in self and others) overcomes the limitations of the standard argument of the privileged self which holds that ‘I know that I have a mind because of my experiences, but since I do not have any

experiences of your experiences, how do I know that you also have a mind?²¹ The standard argument from analogy is that you are like me in having a body and behaving in certain ways; so by analogy I can infer that you are also similar in having a mind" (Thagard 1988:116). We no longer need to assume a process of 'nominalist bootstrapping' (Beckwith 1991) or 'imaginative construction' (Harris 1989) that paves the way from self experience to the recognition and appreciation of experience in others. Emotion terms are part of language games and as such are learned with the use of language (Wittgenstein 1953, no 384). However, this also implies that there is no use of a particular emotion term that covers all different contexts. Rather, the peculiarities of genre differences – such as the choice of a more detached third-person perspective vs. a more involved first-person perspective – and the way they are linguistically constituted determine ultimately what an emotion term 'means'.

Reconsidering how we decided to rely on the domain of 'emotion discourse' as the backdrop for our empirical investigation of what we called 'double emotions' (section 2.2), we will spend the remainder of this chapter on the consequences with regard to the developmental approach outlined in our introductory section. In contrast to relatively well established lexical domains, the telos of development for our domain of 'emotion discourse' has drastically changed from an efficient mapping of conceptual units onto the appropriate lexical units, as for instance in the domain of emotion words. The ability to reason, understood here as 'explaining oneself', regarding 'having had' [or the possibility of 'having'] two different emotions at the same time, requires the recognition of 'the problem', and the anticipation of an audience that is able to make sense of the offered resolution to the problem.

The standard prerequisites for the emergence of 'reasoning discourse' are quite different from the rationalist prerequisite to a linguistic knowledge that governs the potentiality of language performance. The child, being born into language practices, according to the orientation we have chosen, has to actively participate in the discourse practices, in order to establish these practices so that linguistic actions and ultimately linguistic forms can be abstracted from these practices. Again, the rivalry rationalist orientation views this process the other way around. The child comes into this world equipped with the rudimentary knowledge out of which the adequate and appropriate forms (as knowledge!) can 'mature'; so that this knowledge can be brought to – and as such can constitute: action. Thus, while we have suggested that categorical distinctions, i.e., knowledge, emerge(s) out of action and social practices, the dominant

²¹ There may be something called 'experiencing emotions in others' such as 'feeling happy or sad for someone else'. How can we not be 'happy' when we see others being 'happy'; or how can we not be 'sad' in the midst of others being 'sad'?

rationalist position views action emerging out of pre-existing knowledge; and 'action' in this latter approach is first of all understood as action of the individual.

In light of these fundamental differences in terms of domain, telos, and the role of the organism/person in the development of language, it should not come as a surprise that the so-called 'mechanisms' of the developmental process are conceived of quite differently as well. While the developmental organization of linguistic knowledge is organized by 'principles' (and 'parameters'), we have suggested 'perspective taking' as central to the discourse/practice approach to language development. 'Taking' one of several potential 'perspectives' – or choosing a 'vantage point', as we have called it in section 2.3 (see also Bamberg 1991a, 1994) – is not the outcome of a reflective mental process, but rather presents an aspect of the ready-to-hand mode of action (Heidegger 1927/1962) in context. However, this aspect seems to be relatively central, since it mediates the speaker's stance in relation to the content of the verbal forms with his/her stance toward the recipient of the intended message, and as such it signals how the speaker intends to be understood (see Bamberg & Reilly 1994). We have touched on this relationship between speakers' communicative intentions, the content of the message, and the recipient in section 2.3 with the discussion on the issue of 'involvement'.

Returning to the last component of the 'developmental approach', i.e., the issue of methodology – and in light of this to the question of what constitutes 'good' data, we want to start by clearing away the predominant understanding of methods and methodology as a 'tool box' – making available the appropriate 'tools' and techniques to 'operate' on pre-existing data. In contrast to this common and widely shared belief, it should have become clear from our previous discussion that decisions on how to collect and how to analyze 'data' is always intimately intertwined with other assumptions about the organization of the 'developmental approach'.

The decision we made in section 2 to view talk about two simultaneous emotions (and along the same line, to view talk about 'simple' (single) emotions) as part of 'reasoning discourse', and not as part of 'lexical development' that reflects 'conceptual development', had important ramifications for the rest of the study. To use comprehension data to test underlying mappings between concepts and linguistic forms henceforth had to be ruled out as an adequate testing ground. Along the same line of reasoning, to wait for 'natural' occurrences of children being in a situation of feeling two emotions at the same time, and at that moment questioning them on their 'feeling states', had to be ruled, too. Neither the 'understanding' nor the 'actual feeling' were at the center of this project; rather, how 'perspectivizing' different situations of

emotion conflicts are communicated. Again, the notion of 'perspective' should not be misunderstood as a conceptual notion that exists outside and previous to the communicative act. Understanding communication as bringing SELF and (concrete as well as generalized) OTHER into a relationship, talk about emotions – and particular about 'double emotions' – required an involvement relationship between speaker and topic as well as between speaker and audience. The topic in the task we presented to our subjects was somewhat 'controlled' (and as such contrived) by the six emotion constellations; while the audience (in spite of being in actuality the interviewer) was somewhat 'varied' along the dimension of sharing different presuppositions and interests: the Personal Narrative as sharing an interest in the narrator him-/herself [where the experience stands for some form of thematic coherence/identity], the Possibility Question Elaboration as an interest in the narrator's more detached explanatory capacities, and the third-person protagonist story elaboration as a shared interest in others' lives as well as in the narrator's imaginative problem solutions.

As such, PERSPECTIVE TAKING is best understood as shaping the process of articulation, and simultaneously as taking shape in the process of articulation. As such it can be held accountable for giving boundaries to – and in this sense 'shaping' – events (see also Hopper 1993), actors and personae, plots, and ultimately 'life'. At the same time, perspective 'takes shape' in line with linguistic, communicative conventions (see Fox & Jaspersen and Ono & Thompson, this volume). 'Good data' emerge in the interface between these positions. They never are 'out there', just to be collected, picked up, and taken home for analysis. What counts as 'good data' is part of 'justification discourse' along the same line as we suggested 'double emotions' are – things for which we don't even have a name.

APPENDIX 1

EXAMPLES OF SCENARIOS PRESENTED IN THE 'STORY COMPLETION TASK'

[1] AFRAID/ANGRY

- (1) Once, Chippy Chipmunk and Harry Hare went to the other side of the river in a canoe. After a while, they wanted to go back home, because it was slowly getting dark.
- (2) Harry Hare, who had ridden in the front of the canoe on the way over, jumped into the front again.
- (3) "Oh no," said Chippy Chipmunk, "You got to ride in the front last time. Now it's my turn. You have to sit in the back."
- (4) Harry Hare said, "Come on, let's go. If you don't get in behind me, I'm going to leave without you."
- (5) Now, Chippy Chipmunk is ANGRY, because Harry Hare is not taking turns.
- (6) But at the same time, he is AFRAID, because he doesn't want to stay behind all by himself.

Interviewer: "Now, can you finish the story?"
(If no response: "What happens next?")

[2] HAPPY/ANGRY

- (1) Miss Piggy Pig and Mr. Felix Fox were good friends. One day, they wanted to go to Michael Mouse's birthday party.
- (2) Felix Fox, who wanted to try out Miss Piggy Pig's new bicycle, begged his friend, "Miss Piggy Pig, let's take your new bicycle. Then we can speed over to Michael Mouse's party."
- (3) Miss Piggy Pig said, "Well O.K., but no speeding. I want us to be really careful with my new bike."
- (4) So, Miss Piggy Pig was riding the bike and Felix Fox was sitting on the back. But Miss Piggy Pig was riding so slow, and Felix Fox wanted to go really fast. So Felix Fox began to tickle Miss Piggy Pig. Miss Piggy Pig began to laugh so hard that she lost control of the bike, and they both fell off and hit the ground.
- (5) Now, Miss Piggy Pig was ANGRY, because Felix Fox had caused the accident.
- (6) But at the same time, she was HAPPY, because nobody got hurt.

Interviewer: "Now, can you finish the story?"
(If no response: "What happened next?")

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